








































I, Stephen David Bonnell confirm that the work presented in this thesis is 
my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I 








































The essay is composed of two parts. The first part responds to 
Trendelenburg’s objections (in his Logische Untersuchungen) to Hegel’s 
derivation of the concept ‘becoming’ from the concepts ‘pure being’ and 
‘pure nothing’ in the Science of Logic. To do this, I present an outline of the 
first steps of the Logic. The aim is to suggest that Trendelenburg and Hegel 
have different standards for what an adequate ‘becoming’ concept is. 
Trendelenburg emphasises the requirement that the concept be capable of 
capturing difference intrinsic to the content of the concept. Yet Hegel 
holds that the concept ‘becoming’ can be adequate despite the fact that it 
has no difference intrinsic to a content because it has no content at all. I 
point to Hegel’s account of vanishing as the sense of movement in the 
opening stages of the logic. The second part is a constructive account of 
what I take concepts and some of the senses of movement to be in Hegel. 
It will draw on the account I have given of the opening stages of the logic. 
It will be based on some distinctions I find in §53 of the preface to the 
Phenomenology. Included as an appendix is my translation of the section 
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Introduction to movement1 
 
This section provides a general introduction to movement in Hegel’s 
work. I focus on outlining the nature of transitions in the system and in 
what sense they can be considered movements. This is followed in Part I 
by a discussion of ‘becoming’, which I take to be the most general sense of 
movement in the system and therefore fundamental to any understanding 
of such movement. 
 In Part I, I look at the readings of the derivation of becoming given 
by Beiser and Houlgate and try to rebut arguments against that derivation 
given by Trendelenburg. Trendelenburg’s reading focuses on the 
Encyclopaedia Logic and I argue against it with details given in the larger 
version of the logic, the Science of Logic. This will lead me to differ from 
Houlgate and Beiser in my reading of the derivation. 
 Trendelenburg argues that if becoming is only composed of being 
and nothing, it cannot be an adequate concept of becoming, since the 
Encyclopaedia makes clear that its sole logical feature would be self-
identity, precluding the inner difference that any concept of movement 
must have. However, in the larger Logic, Hegel is careful to emphasise that 
becoming is composed of being and nothing in their identity with one and 
another and their difference. I spend some time identifying where this 
difference could be, whilst respecting what is correct in Trendelenburg’s 
reading. (My translation of Trendelenburg’s text is in the appendix.) 
                                                
1 My first thanks go to Professor Sebastian Gardner for his teaching and 
supervision. Both have provided me with a fruitfully high standard for what 
counts as textual attentiveness, philosophical rigour, and expressive clarity in 
dealing with some of the most insightful, creative, and verbose figures in the 
history of philosophy. Secondly, I would like to thank members past and present 
of UCL’s Science of Logic reading group for our long, collective, ongoing struggle, 
which no number of books could properly replace. I especially thank our most 
committed members: Robin Halpin, Paul Healey, Simon Angseop Lee, Edmund 
P. Smith, and Philip Walden. Thirdly, to Marcello Garibbo and my viva 
examiners Professor Stephen Houlgate and Dr Katerina Deligiorgi, who read this 
text with care and have provided inestimably valuable constructive criticism. 
Their comments have already helped me begin to further develop the ideas and 
arguments found here. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous funder of a 
grant, who made continuing this research possible when its future was uncertain. 
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 The conclusion of Part I is that ‘becoming’, the most general sense 
of movement, is not in the content of thinking but rather in the activity of 
thinking. I draw out the consequences of this conclusion in Part II, which 
is a constructive account of different senses of movement found in §53 of 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 First, we turn to the general introduction to movement. 
 
§1 Thinking and non-spatiotemporal movement 
We are all familiar with spatiotemporal movements, which are changes in 
something’s position through time. In Hegel’s work we find the notion of 
‘dialectical’ movement. It’s clear that, whilst Hegel holds that dialectic 
occurs within thinking and encompasses thinking through contradictory 
judgements of some subject-matter (à la Kant), it doesn’t occur only in the 
thinking of the subject-matter, but rather also in things themselves. 
According to Hegel, the systematic structure of thinking or reason is the 
systematic structure of being. As Hegel famously expresses this point: 
‘[w]hat is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational’ (PR 20).2 Or, at 
greater length: 
 
When it is said that thought as objective thought constitutes the core of 
the world, it may seem as if, by this, consciousness is supposed be to be 
attributed to natural things. We feel a certain resistance to construing 
the inner activity of things as thinking, since we say that human beings 
distinguish themselves from all natural things through thinking. We 
would therefore have to speak of nature as the system of unconscious 
thoughts, a 'petrified intelligence', as Schelling puts it. Instead of using 
the expression thoughts, it would thus be better to speak of thought-
determinations, in order to avoid any misunderstanding. In general, 
from what has been said so far, the logical dimension is to be sought as 
a system of thought-determinations for which the opposition of the 
subjective and the objective (in its ordinary sense) falls away. This 
                                                
2 The titles of Hegel’s works are abbreviated as indicated in the ‘References’ 
section. 
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meaning of thinking and its determinations is expressed more directly 
by the ancients when they say that νοῦς governs the world — or when 
we say that reason exists in the world and mean by it that reason is the 
soul of the world, residing in it, immanent in it as its ownmost, 
innermost, its universal. (EL §24 Addition 1) 
 
Hegel considers dialectic to be an inherent part of reason. Indeed, as Hegel 
puts it, ‘dialectic makes up the very nature of thinking’ (EL §11) such that 
‘dialectic’ is the concept of the activity of thinking (EL §41 Addition 1).3 
Now, since Hegel holds (1) dialectic is the constitution of the activity of 
thinking, (2) the latter’s systematic structure is reason, and (3) the structure 
of reason is equally that of thinking and being, it follows that dialectic is 
equally inherent in thinking and the objective subject matter of thinking. 
Hegel notes that ‘[d]ialectic is commonly regarded as an external and 
negative activity which does not belong to the fact itself’ (SL 21.40) but, he 
says, 
 
this method is not something distinct from its subject matter and 
content — for it is the content in itself, the dialectic which it possesses 
within itself, which moves the subject matter forward. (SL 21.38; cf. EL 
§41 Addition 1)4 
 
The ‘method’ in the system is not a set of rules for systematic thinking set 
out in advance and used to produce an adequate system, but rather the 
systematic process that is produced by the self-development of the subject 
matter in thought-determinations (see SL 21.8). This method is the true 
content of the Logic in that it is method that develops throughout the Logic 
from beginning to end. It is justifiably called a method because it is a 
process or procedure of thinking that is systematic and that produces 
knowledge. 
                                                
3 Hegel actually says that dialectic is the name for the activity of thinking, but I 
take this to be the name for what it is constitutively such as calling milk ‘milk’ 
and not what it is accidentally such as calling Richard a scoundrel. 
4 I use the Gesammelte Werke pagination found in the margins of Di Giovanni’s 
English translation of the Science of Logic. 
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 Hegel ‘know[s] that it is the one and only true method’ (SL 21.38) 
because true knowledge of some subject-matter (which turns out to be 
method itself in the Logic) is the cognition of its own development from its 
own internal dialectic and the method here is the process of following this 
self-development of the subject matter. Development is internal, 
dialectically produced, and goal-directed change: something changing into 
what it is as a result of its own internal contradictions. 
 This is an instance of a wider tendency to associate terms such as 
truth, contradiction, concept, judgement, and inference that are 
traditionally associated with thinking about being and beings with the 
being and beings themselves (Inwood, 1992: 16). Hegel holds ‘that thought 
is not distinct from things, but is embedded in them and responsible for 
their nature and development’ (Inwood, 1992: 16). As Inwood puts it, 
 
For Hegel, dialectic does not involve a dialogue either between two 
thinkers or between a thinker and his subject-matter. It is conceived as 
the autonomous self-criticism and self-development of the subject-
matter, of, e.g., a form of consciousness or a concept. (1992: 81) 
 
For Hegel, ‘[t]he dialectic of objective things must be internal to them, 
since they can only grow and perish in virtue of contradictions actually 
present in them’ (Inwood 1992: 82, emphasis added). Since true 
knowledge is cognition of something’s development and development is 
internal, dialectically-produced, goal-directed change, true knowledge of 
anything requires cognition of its internal contradictions and how they 
produce some goal-directed change within that thing. Dialectic, as the 
activity of thinking, is thus equally a part of thinking and of real things, 
since both change and develop rationally in that they change and develop 
in response to internal contradictions.  
 As such, it is clear that movement or change in the system is not 
limited to space and time, its occupants, or spatiotemporal concepts (all 
three of which I now refer to as ‘the spatiotemporal’) with thought a static 
outside observer thereof. Movement or change is also in thinking and it is 
of the exact same kind as that found in the spatiotemporal. Dialectical 
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movement, as seen above, is a constitutive element of every part of 
scientific knowledge, including the Science of Logic. The concepts used and 
related in the Science of Logic are logically prior to and therefore 
independent of those of the Philosophy of Nature, which is where space and 
time appear, though they are not thereby static and observational of 
movement and change. 
 Dialectical movement is meaningful in abstraction from the 
spatiotemporal. This movement is atemporal. It is difficult to comprehend 
how anything atemporal can move. A movement, change, or development 
is a process, which is, by definition, temporal. There is one easy sense in 
which there is process in the atemporal system. My thoughts about 
conceptual truths such as the sum of the angles of a triangle being 180° are 
not only about particular triangles, for if no triangle had ever been drawn 
or otherwise formed the conditional would still be true that if x is a shape 
with three corners, then x’s internal angles total 180°. It is thus not 
necessarily (and so constitutively) a truth about any actual occupant of 
space-time. Rather, it is a true conditional, one based on modality, or what 
is and is not necessary or possible. Modality is not constitutively 
spatiotemporal, even if it necessarily conditions every occupant of the 
spatiotemporal. Modal truths can be cognised in abstraction from the 
spatiotemporal in the form of conditionals. 
 Similarly, processes can be cognised as conditionals: if being, then 
nothing. One can cognise the rational implications of such-and-such. In 
short, rational inference is a non-spatiotemporal process. One might 
object, however, that inference is possible only because the thinking mind 
is temporal. Thinking through the stages of an inference is itself a 
temporal process. Yet, whilst a temporal mind follows an inference 
temporally, it need not do so with reference to any particular 
spatiotemporal occupant. 
 Some philosophers have conceived of thinking as atemporal, 
despite the temporality of individual thinkers with reference to an 
atemporal God and yet if thinking can move it is puzzling how it is 
atemporal but if it is performed by a temporal being it is puzzling how it 
can be atemporal. Rational inferences are constitutively nowhere, even 
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when exemplified or instantiated by reality or the thinking mind. So, we can 
say that the concept ‘movement’ as used in the Science of Logic is, though 
never assessed as a category, an inference-like relation between concepts 
and so this ‘movement’ has a wider sense than ‘spatiotemporal 
movement’. 
 
§2 Restful unity as the result of every dialectical movement 
There have been extensive discussions of many of the transition concepts 
we find in Hegel’s works. Examples include 'becoming', 'vanishing', 
'passage', 'passing over', 'disappearance', and 'transgression of limit’.5  The 
most well known transition concept from Hegel’s work is ‘sublation’ 
(Aufhebung) and its verbal form ‘sublate’ (aufheben).6 Aufheben has three 
main senses: ‘(1) “to raise, to hold, lift up”; (2) “to annul abolish, destroy, 
cancel, suspend”; (3) “to keep, save, preserve”’ (Inwood, 1992: 283). Since 
it is the most well known transition concept, looking at the sense in which 
aufheben is or involves movement will be instructive. 
 Aufhebung is the integration of ‘double transitions into a single, 
unified concept’, according to Burbidge (2007: 90). Formulated slightly 
differently, Aufhebung is the ‘collapsing of two reciprocal movements in 
equilibrium into a peaceful unity’ (Burbidge, 2007: 90). An example of this 
is the unity of ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ in ‘measure’. As Hegel puts it, 
 
for the totality to be posited, a double transition is required, not only the 
transition of one determinateness into the other, but equally the 
transition of this other into the first, going back into it. Through the 
first transition, the identity of the two is present at first only in itself: 
quality is contained in quantity, but the latter still is only a one-sided 
                                                
5 These are often discussed in terms of ‘movement’. Consider the following 
quotes. ’The name that fits such a movement is "becoming"' (Burbidge, 2007: 91). 
'Close observation shows that beings are always engaged in sublating a "not" or 
lack. The least complex form of this movement is "becoming"' (de Boer, 2000: 
229). 'It is this movement — this passing-over or disappearance' (Burbidge, 2007: 
90; cf. Burbidge, 1993: 96). 
6 These are also considered in terms of movement: ’[t]he movement consists in the 
fact that a one-side moment sublated itself and passes over into its opposite' 
(Adler, 1842 – as translated in Stewart, 2003: 401). See also Crooks (1997: 278). 
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determinateness. Conversely, that quantity is equally contained in 
quality, that it is equally also only as sublated, this results in the 
second transition, the going back into the first determinateness. This 
remark regarding the necessity of the double transition is everywhere of 
great importance for scientific method. (SL 21.320) 
 
In the transition of ‘quality’ to ‘quantity’ it is shown that ‘quality is 
contained in quantity’ and any identity of the two is ‘only implicitly 
present’. So, the transition from quality to quantity shows that any quality 
is potentially identified as a quantity. For example, any something (a 
quality) can be one or two or three (quantified). The second transition is 
that ‘quantity' is also contained in ‘quality’. The transition from quantity to 
quality shows that any quantity is potentially identified as a quality. For 
example, a ratio (a quantity) is so-and-so such that ‘the determinateness of 
either quantum lies reciprocally in the determinateness of the other’ (has 
determinate qualities) (EL §674). 
 With this, the identity of ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ is no longer 
implicit but rather explicit. The identity is ‘measure’: a quantum identified 
with, or applied to, a quality (Burbidge, 2007: 201). The identifiability of 
quality and quantity is only implicit in quality- and quantity-concepts. 
When qualifying (‘this is a something, not an other’), it is not necessary to 
explicitly quantify. When quantifying (‘these are two’), it is not necessary 
to explicitly assess the qualities of quanta. In the concept of ‘measure’, both 
qualification and quantification are necessarily explicit and therefore 
‘measure’ is a concept that identifies both. For example, the measure of 
temperature (a ‘specifying measure’) is the qualitative identification of a 
quality (EL §730).  
 The relation of the quality and quantity to one another is distinct in 
different forms of measure. In specifying measures such as temperature, 
for instance, the quantification is a uniform scale (where (a) the difference 
between every unit is the same and (b) every temperature is quantifiable 
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on the scale7) and yet the change in the temperature itself is non-uniform. 
This is shown by the fact that the temperature of some medium (such as 
the air) can be constant whilst the occupants of that medium (such as 
plants, animals, or rocks) can vary wildly. As Hegel puts it, 
 
the particular bodies in the medium differ in the way they absorb the 
temperature, for through their immanent measure they determine it as 
received from outside themselves and the change of temperature in 
any one of them does not correspond in a direct ratio with that of the 
medium or of the other bodies among themselves. (EL §730) 
 
Burbidge describes the transitions from quality to quantity and quantity to 
quality as movements (Burbidge, 2007: 90). As a general observation, 
reciprocal movements tend to collapse into peaceful unities (with the 
necessity of this demonstrated in each instance, but never generally) 
(Burbidge, 2007: 90). Aufhebung is the resulting peaceful unity. As such, the 
transition from quality to quantity and that from quantity to quality are 
movements. Measure, however, is not a movement, but a peaceful unity, a 
‘result’. As such, we can draw some conclusions. Movement is a necessary 
antecedent to any Aufhebung, though not a feature of the peaceful unity. 
All Aufhebungen are peaceful unities. No Aufhebung is itself a movement.  
 Except it is not true that anything that is an Aufhebung is thereby 
not a movement. Throughout the Logic, we find examples of process-
concepts (and therefore movement-concepts, since any process requires 
movement) that are results. The ‘relation of repulsion and attraction’ is a 
process and it is the result of ‘exclusion of the one’ and ‘the one one of 
attraction’. ‘Affirmative infinity’ is also a process that is the result of 'the 
infinite in general’ and ‘the alternating determination of the finite and the 
infinite’. 
 Furthermore, some of these process-results are the results of other 
process-concepts. ’Action and reaction’ is a process that is the result of 
‘formal causality' and ‘the determinate relation of causality’. Various 
                                                
7 ‘[T]he alteration of the temperature proceeds on the scale of an arithmetical 
progression, increasing or decreasing uniformly’ (EL §730). 
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syllogisms, which require rational inferences (themselves transitions), are 
results of others in the ‘Syllogism’ section of the Logic.8 Therefore, the 
‘peacefulness’ that results from some prior concepts, including concepts of 
movement, is sometimes a movement and sometimes not. 
 Aufheben, the verbal form of Aufhebung, however, is a concept of 
movement. It is used by Hegel to refer to ‘what happens in each transition 
on its own’ as well as the double transition before it collapses (Burbidge, 
2007: 90). ‘Being', for instance, ‘"sublates itself” in moving to nothing, and 
vice versa’ (Burbidge, 2007: 90). In the case of being and nothing, Burbidge 
notes, ‘thinking pure indeterminate being turns out to be thinking 
nothing; and when we think pure nothing, indeterminate nothing is in our 
mind so that this empty thought is the same as the one we had when 
thinking pure being’ (Burbidge, 2007: 90). Being sublating itself is a 
movement and nothing sublating itself is a movement.  
 The relationship of being and nothing is reciprocal in two ways. 
Firstly, being transitions into nothing and nothing into being. Secondly, 
the transition itself is identical. Thinking pure indeterminate being turns 
out to be thinking pure nothing. Likewise, thinking pure nothing turns out 
to be thinking pure indeterminate being.9 This ‘turning out to be’ is what 
Hegel calls ‘vanishing’. Being and nothing vanish in that, through 
thinking either of these thoughts alone, one turns out to be thinking the 
other and not the first, and yet not because one has thought anything in 
particular about the first. There is no middle term or mediation of either 
one and its other. The first has simply vanished. 
 Hegel is clear that vanishing is at least sometimes an instance of 
sublating. The difference between being and nothing itself vanishes or ‘the 
distinction between them is, but equally sublates itself and is not’ (SL 21.79). 
                                                
8 It is also not true that Aufhebung is the integration of ‘double transitions into a 
single, unified concept’, since there are a few examples of Aufhebungen being 
double-concepts, including ‘action and reaction’ and ‘form and content’. That is, 
unless (1) ’action and reaction’ and ‘form and content’ are not themselves 
Aufhebungen much as ‘becoming’, whilst being constituted by being and nothing, 
is not their Aufhebung or (2) each of these, e.g. ’action and reaction’, is a single, 
unified concept. 
9 Though I will later highlight the importance of the asymmetry between these 
movements. 
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This transition of vanishing is what Hegel calls ‘becoming’ (Burbidge, 
2007: 90-91). Becoming is not an Aufhebung, since it is not a collapse of two 
reciprocal movements. It is rather the concept of these movements. Being 
sublating itself and nothing sublating itself are both instances of 
becoming. 
 The eventual collapse of these reciprocal movements (with the 
collapse of the difference or purity of being and nothing) only comes in 
Dasein, which is the vanishing of the vanishing itself, the difference 
between the two referred to above. As Houlgate puts it, 
 
[b]eing and nothing start out by vanishing, but precisely by virtue of 
vanishing into one another they show themselves to be 
indistinguishable and so no longer to be purely other than one another 
at all. This means that there can no longer be any vanishing or 
transition of one into the other. That in turn means that there can no 
longer be any becoming. All there can be is the undifferentiatedness 
and ‘sameness’ of the two. (Houlgate, 2006: 290) 
 
As Hegel puts it, ‘[t]heir vanishing is therefore the vanishing of becoming, 
or the vanishing of the vanishing itself. Becoming is a ceaseless unrest that 
collapses into a quiescent result’ (SL 21.93). Becoming is pure being’s 
vanishing into pure nothing and pure nothing into pure being. Yet when 
they become indistinguishable, they are no longer pure. They are mixed up 
with one another. As such, they are no longer opposed. As such, there is 
no vanishing and so no becoming (Houlgate, 2006: 291). This 
indistinguishability of pure being and pure nothing is the Aufhebung of 
pure being and pure nothing and is called Dasein. 
 
§3 Concepts’ intelligibility through internal contraries 
In many of the discussions in the secondary literature, it seems that any of 
the concepts studied in the system (by which I mean those that have their 
own sections) can be characterised as 'a movement'. To characterise a 
concept as a movement sometimes seems to be to characterise its process 
of synthesising its internal contraries (its ‘dialectic’). The following 
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comment exemplifies this, where one truly thinks the concept in question 
only if one thinks both of its ‘two sides’: its being (identity) and not-being 
(difference). 
 
The difficulty of death remains that thought must not forget the 
concept's two sides: it both is and is not — for only the movement of 
contradiction, the becoming of their identity and difference, is true. 
(Haas, 2000: 226) 
 
To truly think with a concept is to think the movement of that concept’s 
contradiction. This means neither specifying what something is nor 
specifying what it isn’t is sufficient to determine a being in thought. 
Rather, determining a being in thought is thinking what it is and what it 
isn’t. Yet, a list of these will not do. Rather, to determine a being in 
thought is to think the movement of contradiction or ‘becoming’ of their 
identity and difference. I thus read the 'becoming of their identity and 
difference' as the becoming in which we find the two sides of the concept 
(call it A-B-becoming) as constituted by two kinds of relation. The first is a 
relation of identity. The second is a relation of difference.  
 It might be thought that I have chosen the unnatural reading of the 
genitive. The natural reading is that it refers to a process whereby the two 
sides come about or change, but does not constitute their identity. My 
reading of the genitive suggests that it is rather a process that is 
constituted by these two relations: of identity and of difference. I need not 
deny the first sense in holding to the second. The second will be more 
central to my explanatory procedure.10 
 An account of the concept in question is only true if it accounts for 
the 'becoming' of these contraries and the 'movement' of contradiction. 
That is, it is only true if it accounts for becoming as constituted by these 
two sides (A and B) through two contrary kinds of relations: one of 
                                                
10 Hegel sometimes seems to use the genitive so as to imply both implied senses 
and intentionally suggest two different things at once, such as the ‘need of 
philosophy’ implying both what philosophy needs and something/someone’s 
need for philosophy (Harris’s footnote at Hegel, Diff.: 89n7). 
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identity (A=B) and one of difference (~(A=B)). An account of the concept 
would not be true if these two sides were not shown to constitute their 
becoming through these two contrary relations. It is clear, then, that the 
thought of these contraries are not some mistake in thinking about 
becoming. Rather, both contrary relations are treated as having 
explanatory value together. 
 As accounted for above, it is the relations between the two sides 
that are contraries: identity and difference. Often, though, the contraries 
are not just contrary relations but also the contrary terms of the relations. 
So, in the beginning of the Logic, pure being and pure nothing are shown 
to be identical yet different.11 These two contrary relations constitute their 
relation. Yet the terms themselves (pure being and pure nothing) are also 
contraries. Indeed, this is visible in the quote above. The 'two sides' of the 
concept of death are the specific senses in which it 'is' and 'is not'. 
 What this presupposes is some way in which contrary relations 
(and, in most cases, contrary terms) constitute a 'movement'. Whether the 
movement is presupposed as that which we're trying to explain or not 
does not affect the point. The question of why the terms and their relations 
constitute a movement is of how they can explain the sense in which 
'becoming' is a movement. They must be able to constitute this movement 
in themselves (without reference to becoming) to be genuinely 
explanatory. 
 What makes this question particularly important is that it seems 
that any concept is to be explained in this way, the way in which 
movement is explained. Any concept is to be explained in terms of these 
contrary relations of identity and difference and often with contrary terms 
as the relata. This is how movements or concepts of movement are to be 
explained, since the configuration of relations itself constitutes movement. 
If any concept is to be explained with these explanatory criteria, and these 
explanatory criteria are sufficient for movement (in constituting it), then 
an adequate account given for any concept will imply that it is a 
                                                
11 To be discussed in detail later in Part I. 
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movement. As the author later puts it, '[t]he contradiction of death [...] 
must be thought as a movement' (Haas, 2000: 226). 
 So, as I see it, Hegel's accounting for concepts as movements is to be 
justified by him holding that any adequate account of movement must be 
accounted for in terms of a pair of contraries, most generally being and 
not-being, related in two contrary ways, most basically identity and 
difference. Why must an adequate account of something's movement be 
constructed in this way? 
 As Haas puts it earlier in the book, '[m]ovement' is 'the movement 
[...] of conceptual thought' and ‘Hegel's way of thinking the logic of 
contradiction, the two-sided concept' (Haas, 2000: 89). 'Movement' then 
refers to a process of conceptual thinking. It is also, as we have seen, the 
way in which any constitutively contradictory concept is to be accounted 
for (and so all concepts, at least considered metaphysically). The 
contradiction that constitutes death 'must be thought as a movement' 
(Haas, 2000: 226). So, the way in which a constitutively contradictory 
concept is to be accounted for is in terms of a reference to a process of 
conceptual thinking. 
 I take it that the thought is not just that this is a way Hegel has 
chosen to think the logic of contradiction but also that Hegel thinks this is 
the right way to think this logic. So, we take 'movement' to be a process of 
thinking required to give an adequate account of concepts constituted by 
(and thereby synthesising) contraries. It can seem, from this, that 
movement is a process of thinking about certain determinations or concepts. 
Yet Hegel sometimes suggests that that which thought is about — the content 
— itself moves. 
 Consider 'the movement of being itself' (SL 21.66) or the 
'movement' of the finite and the infinite (SL 21.135). ’[P]ure self-
consciousness', too, 'is a movement within pure concepts' (Phen. §574). 
'Purpose [...] is movement' (Phen. §22). Universality is movement (Phen. 
§590). In these cases, it is not always clear whether we are referring to the 
process of thinking or its content. As we have seen, this ambiguity has 
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some reason behind it. In the case of thinking, the movement is the 
movement of both the process of thinking and the content itself.12  
                                                
12 This can lead to some difficulties when the concept under investigation is a 
concept that we would ordinarily recognise to be a concept of movement or of 
something that is constitutively processual. The concept of becoming (SL 21.69-
96) and locomotion (PN §§260-261), for instance, are both of these. Is the 
movement of these concepts that of the process of thinking about them or is it 
that these concepts are about movements? Or is it both, as seems to be the case in 
the examples of thinking about mental contents above? Or is it something else? 
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Part I 




§4 Introducing Trendelenburg’s arguments against the derivation 
of becoming 
I want to use Trendelenburg's objections against the possibility of deriving 
concepts of movement in an a priori system to provoke and guide 
discussion on the sense in which there is movement in Hegel’s system. My 
focus will be on his challenge to Hegel’s derivation of becoming from pure 
being and pure nothing. As what I consider to be the most general sense of 
movement in the Logic, the sense in which becoming is movement will be 
a good guide as to at least one important sense in which there is 
movement in the system more generally. 
 I will start this essay by presenting a reading of the opening 
sections of the logic, which Trendelenburg quotes in giving his objections. 
As I will show, Trendelenburg argues that Hegel's concept of becoming is 
not a concept of movement. There are four reasons we can draw from 
Trendelenburg’s text. Firstly, Hegel’s concept ‘becoming’ is and only is the 
concept of the unity of pure being and pure nothing. Pure being and pure 
nothing have no content and so neither can be about becomings. Nor can 
their unity, since that unity just is their contentlessness.  
 Secondly, pure being and pure nothing have no inner 
differentiation. That unity is constituted by the identity of the concepts of 
pure being and pure nothing qua contentless. As such, they must be 
concepts about logical self-identity. As Trendelenburg puts it, ‘[s]ince both 
pure being and also not-being express rest, so consequently, if the unity of 
both set out should come to be [in thought], the next task of thinking can 
only be to find a resting unification [outside of thought]’ (Trendelenburg, 
1870: 38).  
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 Thirdly, contentlessness does not permit differentiation in (or 
between) concepts. So, the unity of pure being and pure nothing cannot, 
by Hegel's account of pure being and pure nothing, permit inner 
differentiation. As such, the concept of becoming does not permit inner 
differentiation. Yet inner differentiation is required for a concept of 
movement. A concept of movement must be analysable into being and 
nothing. As the day becomes, that becoming must be analysable into it 
being and not-being (yet). So, Hegel's concept of becoming is not a concept 
of movement since it cannot capture this. It ought not, given that it is the 
identity of being and nothing, be analysable into any kind of extended 
process in which one can pass into another. From this conclusion, 
Trendelenburg draws another: it is not an adequate concept of becoming.  
 Fourthly, Trendelenburg seems to hold that a concept of movement 
must be a concept in which one thing or part has an impetus to produce 
another in which its movement continues. However, neither being nor 
not-being have the impetus to do this in becoming since they are wholly 
identical. If they are not wholly identical, they are distinct, and Hegel 
doesn’t show how either one in its distinctness leads to the other. So, 
becoming is inadequate as a concept of movement. 
 Trendelenburg’s arguments are valid and his textual reading has 
merits, which I will highlight alongside my counter-arguments. My main 
point will be to highlight that Hegel's aim with the concept ‘becoming’ is 
not to provide a concept of movement in the sense Trendelenburg wants. 
Hegel's aim is to account for becoming as a concept with movement. As I 
understand it, a concept with movement is one such that when and only 
when thinking thinks with it, the thinking that thinks with it is movement. 
A concept with movement is not necessarily a concept of movement. A 
concept that entails the movement of thought need not be about any 
movement, especially not a spatiotemporal one of the kind that 
Trendelenburg seems to demand. 
 As I understand it, all of Trendelenburg’s objections rest on the 
thought that if the concept ‘becoming’ is to be adequate it must be capable 
of being about becomings. I will hold that the distinction between these 
two roles for movement in conceptuality –– thinking with a movement-
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concept and thinking of movement with a concept –– allows for (1) 
Trendelenburg to be right about 'becoming', that it is not a concept of 
movement and (2) Hegel to defend the sense in which his concept 
'becoming' (a) has movement, or is a concept with movement and (b) is still 
adequate as the concept 'becoming'.  
 The distinction allows Hegel to agree that there is no differentiation 
in the content of the concept 'becoming' whilst still holding there to be 
differentiation at the level of the form of the concept, what I take to be the 
form of the activity of thinking. This, in turn, allows the concept 
'becoming' the intrinsic differentiation that is required for movement to be 
possible on Trendelenburg's own standards, on Hegel's, and on any 
common sense 'becoming' concept. The required distinction between 
being and nothing can be made at the level of the activity of thinking 
rather than the content of thinking.  
 The concept 'becoming' cannot, to be clear, be a concept of the 
process of thinking through pure being and pure nothing, since then it 
would be a concept with content, of becoming. Rather, if there is to be 
movement then the concept 'becoming' must itself be that movement, that 
process of thinking. The sense in which a concept is an act, for Hegel, will 
help to make the grounds for the possibility of this clear. The concept 
'becoming' is still adequate by Hegel's standards, despite not being a 
concept of movement. Hegel does not need movement in the content of 
becoming. 
 Firstly, the concept 'becoming' does not need to be about movement 
to effect the unity and difference of pure being and pure nothing that 
Hegel needs it to. With this, the criticisms outlined above fail. Secondly, 
we who are trying to understand Hegel do not need it to understand how 
the concept of becoming develops further in the opening stages of the 
Logic. I don’t intend to placate adherents to Trendelenburg's 
understanding of what the concept 'becoming' requires. I will have argued 
that Hegel and Trendelenburg demand different things of the concept 
'becoming'.  
 Insofar as I only show that Hegel's demands for this concept are 
different to Trendelenburg's, I will not have shown that Hegel meets 
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Trendelenburg's demands. Indeed, I will have accepted that he can't meet 
those demands (at least not in this logical context or with regard to the 
concept 'becoming'). I will have accepted that Hegel's concept 'becoming' 
cannot be a concept of movement in the way Trendelenburg seems to 
demand it to be. 
 In seeing how Hegel can respond to Trendelenburg, we will 
nonetheless have gained a more precise understanding of why 
Trendelenburg’s demands are wrong and thereby the sense of movement 
in the system. We will have seen that 'becoming' is a concept with 
movement, but not of movement. The conclusion we are led to by 
Trendelenburg will not simply be dismissed. I take it to be a genuine 
insight that Hegel’s concept ‘becoming’ cannot be a concept of movement 
given its derivation. 
 This might all provide fuel for Trendelenburg’s fire. The Hegelian 
system is so locked in pure thinking that its concept ‘becoming’ cannot be 
about anything, not about the becomings we see all around us but only of 
thought’s immanent activity –– ‘this concrete intuition commanding life 
and death, cannot emerge’ (Trendelenburg, 1870: 38). 
 
§5 The difference puzzle 
The puzzle’s first part: there is no difference 
Trendelenburg starts his objection by noting that 'it is the basic idea of the 
Hegelian dialectic that pure thought presuppositionlessly generates and 
cognises the moments of being out of its own necessity' (Trendelenburg, 
1870: 36). He then quotes from Hegel's Science of Logic and Encyclopaedia 
Logic. The quotes are as follows13: 
 
A beginning is logical in that it is to be made in the element of a free, 
self-contained thought, in pure knowledge. (SL 21.54) 
 
                                                
13 These are the translations of the relevant passages in the Cambridge translations 
of SL and EL.  
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To which Trendelenburg adds ‘thought begins only with itself’ 
(Trendelenburg, 1870: 37). Then: 
 
Pure being constitutes the beginning, because it is pure thought as well 
as the undetermined, simple immediate, and the first beginning cannot 
be anything mediated and further determined. (EL §86) 
 
Now this pure being is a pure abstraction and thus the absolutely negative 
which, when likewise taken immediately, is nothing. (EL §87) 
 
Conversely, nothing, as this immediate, self-same, is likewise the same 
as being. The truth of being as well as of nothing is therefore the unity 
of both; this unity is becoming. (EL §88) 
 
Then, Trendelenburg notes that the concept 'becoming' is analysable into 
being and nothing. ‘While […] the day is becoming, it already is and is not’ 
(Trendelenburg, 1870: 38). The point here seems to be that in that single 
event –– the dawning of the day –– the day that is the subject of this 
becoming both is and is not. 
 I now want to outline some features of how I think Hegel deals 
with concepts. Anything can be part of the content of many different 
concepts. Language is part of the content of the different concepts 'prose' 
and 'letter'. 'Prose' refers to language in its ordinary form, without metrical 
or otherwise poetic structure. That's what prose is. 'Letter' refers to 
written, typed, and/or printed linguistic communication. That's what a 
letter is.  
 Conceptual emptiness is not only part of the content of pure being 
and pure nothing, but exhausts their content. Not only do pure being and 
pure nothing have the same empty content, but they both are and only are 
the concepts of that same empty content. This raises the question of what 
differentiates the two concepts.14 Hegel must also allow for strange 
                                                
14 A longer discussion would address the similarities of this position to the 
position, found in Frege (1892), that there is no difference between 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus' at the level of reference, but there is one at the level sense. The 
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thought. He must allow that the same content can be exhaustively 
captured with contrary concepts. That is, empty content is referred to by 
and only by the concepts 'pure being' and 'pure nothing’. 
 Again, the question comes up of what differentiates the two 
concepts. Also, why are two concepts required for a single content if they 
are only for that content? All of this throws up the question of what logical 
feature of them legitimates the common-sense position that being and 
nothing are contraries, something central to my concerns in this thesis for 
constructing a response to Trendelenburg’s challenge. 
 This is the puzzle of the missing difference. Trendelenburg sees 
Hegel holding becoming to be just the identity of being and nothing. Yet, a 
concept of becoming must be constituted by difference, too. Hegel struggles 
to make sense of how becoming can be, constitutively, an identity and a 
difference. He argues that pure being and pure nothing are identical as 
pure abstractions (EL §87) and that this identity of pure being and pure 
nothing constitutes the unity of the concept 'becoming' (EL §88). 
 Pure being and pure nothing are only identical insofar as they are 
void of internal differentiation. This mutual emptiness is the unity that 
Hegel claims constitutes the unity of ‘becoming’. In fact, as we see above, 
Hegel puts it in a stronger way: the unity of being and nothing is 
becoming (EL §88). Trendelenburg continues: 
 
Pure being, self-same, is rest; nothing — the self-same — is also rest. 
How, out of the unity of two resting representations, has a moving 
becoming come to be? (Trendelenburg, 1870: 38) 
 
The stipulation that pure being and pure nothing are rest is found in 
neither the Science of Logic nor the Encyclopaedia Logic. In fact, Hegel seems 
to suggest they are not at rest in the third remark to the first section of 
‘Becoming’. There, he says that, '[t]ransition is the same as becoming except 
                                                                                                                                          
concept of 'Hesperus' and the concept of 'Phosphorus' both refer to the planet 
Venus. They have the same referent. Not only that, but they only refer to Venus. 
There are similarities between the two positions that I won't have space to 
discuss. In any case, I won't take Frege's discussion as a guide here. 
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that the two terms, from one of which the transition is made to the other, 
are represented in it more as at rest [mehr als [...] ruhend]' (SL 21.81). 'More 
as at rest'. The 'more' here might suggest that more emphasis is put on the 
rest of two terms when expressing their transitional relation than is 
expressed in their becoming relation. That at least has the implication that 
the emphasis on rest in 'becoming' is less than that in ‘transition'. 
 On a stronger reading, though, the claim is that rest is just not a 
feature of becoming, as it is of transition. In transition, we have a move 
from one term at rest to another. In becoming there is no such transition. 
Yet becoming’s moments are being and nothing (they are all it can be 
analysed into). So being and nothing are not at rest. The terms of 
becoming are inseparable and they are so in their becoming one another. As 
such, the terms cannot be thought through on their own in abstraction 
from this becoming. 
 Wilkinson (2000: 268n6) holds that 'Trendelenburg dogmatically 
asserts' that pure being and pure nothing are rest. I disagree. 
Trendelenburg seems to reveal his rationale for holding that pure being 
and pure nothing are at rest in the quote: 'pure being, self-same, is rest; 
nothing — the self-same — is also rest' (Trendelenburg, 1870: 38). Both 
pure being and pure nothing are rest qua self-identical ('self-same'). This is 
the reading of the rationale given by Beiser in a recent discussion. He 
expresses Trendelenburg’s point as follows: 
 
Hegel implies that being is unchanging because he says that it is 
‘identical to itself’, and so forever the same; he also implies that 
nothingness is unchanging, because it too is ‘identical to itself’ and so 
forever the same. But if being and nothingness are both unchanging 
and forever the same, how do we get the concept of becoming from 
them? Both concepts exclude the idea of change, and we cannot get 
change or becoming from something that does not change or become. 
If being is static, and if nothingness is static, their synthesis should also 
be static. (Beiser, 2013: 62-3) 
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The argument would thus be that since pure being is self-identical and 
anything self-identical is at rest, therefore, pure being is at rest. This draws 
from claims that Hegel does make as to the self-identity of the content of 
pure being and pure nothing, the implication that, despite Hegel never 
explicitly saying so, the contents of the concepts of pure being and pure 
nothing are ‘at rest’. In quoting Trendelenburg, Wilkinson elides the 'self-
same' qualification. With Beiser, I take this elided qualification to be the 
rationale for the claim that they are ‘rest'. 
 Though characterising being and nothing as ‘at rest’ is without 
textual basis, the self-identity point stands. If pure being and pure nothing 
are both self-identical, and they are unified precisely insofar as they are 
self-identical, then their unity is pure self-identity. Yet Trendelenburg 
holds that any adequate concept of becoming has some inner 
differentiation feature, too. 
 Becoming as articulated by Hegel is and only is a concept of the 
identity of being and nothing. Yet if becoming is constituted by identity 
alone then one cannot do justice to the necessary feature of any becoming, 
a discernible difference between the being and not-being of the subject of 
change. What if one breaks down becoming into its moments?  
 
[W]hen we find these two moments in becoming by separating them it 
is not at all understood how these concepts can be in one another. The 
one who distinguishes between trunk, branches, and leaves has not 
solved the puzzle of how the parts can come into being from a 
common (source) and live through another. (Trendelenburg, 1870: 38) 
 
This passage uses the physical architecture of a process as an example. A 
trunk carries water through branches to its leaves, but it these parts 
themselves won’t reveal the processes they take part in, nor their co-
dependence. Likewise, analysing becoming into ‘being’ and ‘nothing’, 
doesn’t reveal a process, but parts. Such analysis might work with non-
process concepts. ‘Bachelor’ analyses into ‘man’ and ‘unmarried’ and 
‘unmarried man’ is what ‘bachelor’ means. Whilst analysing a tree into its 
parts will furnish the architecture of its living processes (what the process 
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moves through), it will not itself furnish the process. Likewise, whilst 
becoming is a movement through being and nothing, it is not itself just 
being and nothing. 
 Analysis of the concept of becoming into being and nothing, 
deconstructing this identity by considering being and nothing separately 
is not enough to show how they can ‘live through [one] another’ in the 
concept ‘becoming’ (Trendelenburg, 1870: 38). That is, it does not show 
that either has or even can have the impetus to pass over into the other in 
a movement. The trunk has the impetus to pass over into the branches and 
the leaves. Considering being and nothing on their own is not enough to 
grasp a single process in which these moments only make sense as parts of 
a ‘passing over into one another’. 
 So, even if Hegel could show a difference between being and 
nothing, he wouldn’t have shown a process. On Trendelenburg’s 
presentation, Hegel is out of options. 
 
The puzzle’s second part: there can be no difference 
 
Nowhere in the antecedent stages is movement prefigured, without 
which becoming would be only a being. Since both pure being and also 
not-being are expressed as rest, so, consequently, if the unity of both 
set out should come to be, the next task of thinking can only be to find 
a resting unification. (Trendelenburg, 1870: 38) 
 
Trendelenburg’s argument in the quote above appears to depend on the 
presupposition that if pure being and pure nothing are shown to be 
identical, and ‘becoming’ is the concept that captures this unity, then it is 
the concept that captures only this unity. At the level of content, it seems 
he must be right, for there is no difference in the content of the two 
concepts, only one emphasises what cannot be thought and the other what 
can. If being and nothing refer to what is changeless, then any concept 
composed solely of being and nothing must also refer to what is 
changeless. 
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 Trendelenburg holds that movement has not been prefigured in the 
logic and must itself be derived before it can become a feature of concepts. 
Hegel tries to derive movement from pure being and pure nothing. Yet he 
can’t. They and their unity only have one kind of content: their own 
content. As such, they cannot count as concepts about what they are not.  
 The concept of the content 'being and nothing', that is, the content 
of the concept unifying the two either expresses (a) self-identity or (b) 
some other relation between being and nothing that opposes them 
irrespective of their constitutive self-identity, of which movement 
(becoming) is an example. Yet if it is to be presuppositionlessly derived, it 
must share the same logical qualities as that which pure being and pure 
nothing appeared to have in their separation: that of simple self-identity. 
As such, it must be (a). So, the concept of the unity of being and nothing 
must be a concept of simple self-identity. It cannot have as its content a 
relation between what is and what is not, or its own passing away into 
another.  
 A concept of becoming, however, must be a concept about things 
passing away and coming to be. Yet as simply self-identical, this unity 
(unlike the unity of the intuition of becoming) cannot have any internal 
difference and so cannot have an internal relation between what is and 
what is not of the same subject. As such, it cannot be a concept of its own 
passing away. Therefore, it cannot be a concept of movement in this 
second sense. It lacks the necessary elements to be such a concept. Thus, 
Trendelenburg, accepting the first part of the following claim for the sake 
of argument, rejects the second: 
 
The truth of being as well as of nothing is therefore the unity of both; 
this unity is becoming. (EL §88) 
 
The result of this is that ‘becoming’ as figured here cannot count as the 
becoming of anything, since, as a concept whose unity is constituted by 
nothing but the logical qualities of self-identity, it must have for its content 
(must only be about) things that both are and are not, which in this context 
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means the same thing: pure self-identity. ‘Becoming’ does not refer to 
anything that can change. 
 As a consequence, this concept named ‘becoming’ doesn’t deserve 
the name. It cannot be about becoming as we encounter it in experience. 
Take the day’s dawning, using the concept with the logic above should 
identify the self-identity of that instance of becoming, but it would not 
identify any other feature of it. Yet the self-identity, whether of being or 
nothing is not sufficient to identify its becoming, only its self-identical 
being or nothing. 
 
§6 Pure being in the larger Logic 
In what follows, we will turn to the Science of Logic to fill in some of the 
gaps left by the quotes above and thereby get a clearer idea of Hegel’s 
argument. As we will see, both the concepts of pure being and pure 
nothing are, according to Hegel, only15 acquired and used through an act of 
absolute abstraction (what Hegel refers to as the ‘absolutely negative’ (EL 
§74)). The concept 'pure being' is a concept whose content cannot be of any 
determinate being and so is not a concept of anything. Thinking only 
thinks with the concept for this content through the act of abstracting from 
all content of thought. 
 The content of such abstracting must be empty to count as thinking 
pure being or pure nothing. To think some content by Hegel’s lights is to 
think determinately. Only abstracting from all determinacy, any content 
whatsoever counts as thinking with the concept ‘pure being’. So it is with 
pure nothing too. That concept's content is nothing. Thinking only counts 
as thinking with that concept when it is abstracting from all content. This 
train of thought captures the sense of the passages quoted by 
Trendelenburg. 
 
                                                
15 This means that how he shows them to be acquired a priori here is supposed to 
be the only way to properly acquire them a priori (the standard for properness 
including systematicity). 
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Pure being constitutes the beginning, because it is pure thought as well 
as the undetermined, simple immediate, and the first beginning cannot 
be anything mediated and further determined. (EL §86) 
 
The start of the logic must be the result of empty abstraction. What is left 
after this abstraction? ‘[W]hat we have before us is only simple immediacy. 
[…] [I]t refers to the distinction from what is mediated’ (SL 21.55). 
According to Hegel, ‘[t]he true expression of this simple immediacy is 
therefore pure being […] [which] should mean nothing but being in general; 
being, and nothing else, without further determination and filling’ (SL 
21.55-56). Given that one abstracts from any content of thought qua 
content, the result is not a particular pure (form of) being (such as God, on 
some theologies) but being as such, general and pure. It is contentless 
being. 
 Beiser (2013: 62) notes this, though he qualifies it as abstracted from 
any empirical content. This isn’t strong enough, since then it would still be 
legitimate to think about perfect triangles, the cosmos as such, justice, and 
other non-empirical contents. It’s vital that thinking counts as thinking 
pure being when and only when it does not think any content at all, 
including non-empirical content. 
 ‘Pure being’ is accounted for in a little more depth in the Science of 
Logic than the Encyclopaedia Logic that Trendelenburg quotes. I quote the 
description of thinking with the concept ‘pure being’ in full. 
 
Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its 
indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal 
relatively to an other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a 
reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it 
contained any determination or content which could be distinguished 
in it or by which it could be distinguished from an other. It is pure 
indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if 
one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. 
Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this 
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empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, 
and neither more nor less than nothing. (21.68-69) 
 
Three kinds of features of such thinking stand out: (1) the content it has; 
(2) the relations it stands in; and (3) the activity of thinking it is equivalent 
to. We will focus on the first two here. 
 Firstly, on the content. The concept ‘pure being’ is indeterminate. 
To think with it is not to think any determinate content. It is ‘[b]eing, pure 
being, without any further determination’. We’ve already seen this above. 
Here, though, we can discern two senses in which it lacks determination. 
First, it has no content and so cannot have determinate content. ‘There is 
nothing to be intuited in it’ and ‘[j]ust as little is anything to be thought in 
it’. There is nothing this concept is about. ‘It is pure indeterminateness and 
emptiness’ (emphasis added). 
 Second, it has no inward or outward determination. ‘[I]t has no 
difference within it, nor any outwardly’ (SL 21.69). This is perhaps 
superfluous given that it has no content. To have determination, we infer 
from this passage, is to have diversity in its content (intrinsic diversity, 
let’s call it) or for its content to have reference outwards (extrinsic 
diversity). The concept ‘pure being’ has no content. Having content is 
required to have diversity in or through content. So, the concept ‘pure 
being’ has no intrinsic or extrinsic diversity. 
 Hegel says pure being ‘is equal only to itself’. Such a notion of self-
identity is a simple kind of the kind we can express with ‘A=A’. Yet this is 
not the full story. Hegel qualifies the identity. It is 'also not unequal with 
respect to another'. That can be expressed as ‘~(A≠B)’. It is self-identity 
(A=A) such that ~(A≠B). This seems to make some positive claims about 
the components of pure being, but I hold these features are components of 
the activity of thinking with ‘pure being’. They are relational thoughts. 
Relational thoughts that are not thoughts about relations can still be 
thoughts in relation in some other way.  
 The other way to hand is the activity of thinking with the concept 
‘pure being’. They can be descriptions of thinking’s procedures in thinking 
with the concept ‘pure being’. The claim that thinking with this concept is 
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self-identical implies that this thinking (with the concept ‘pure being’) 
cannot involve thinking anything opposed to the thinking itself, which 
includes any kind of content that is not the thinking itself. 
 Yet, in holding that the concept is not unequal with respect to 
another, a difference is drawn. Thinking being without determinate 
content might be read as being cut off from determinate content. I take it 
that the qualification ~(A≠B) is designed to rule this out. It is not that there 
is some content opposed to it that it is failing to think. Rather, it does not 
grasp external content in some other sense. Thinking’s own vocation, in 
thinking with the concept ‘pure being’ is to think of no content. It is on its 
own terms that it thinks nothing, not the terms of the content or any other 
limiting factor. Thinking with it is not to think of anything. 
 In what sense is ‘pure being’ a concept at all? It necessarily and 
constitutively has no content. Concepts can be differentiated not just at the 
level of content but also at the level of the activity of thinking with that 
concept.16 Though thinking with the concept ‘pure being’ is necessarily 
(indeed, constitutively) not to think of anything, it is to think in a definite 
way. The concept comes with a distinct activity of thinking, though this 
distinctive way is not identified at the level of content. It is to abstract 
from all content by referring thought to that which is distinct from being 
mediated, thinking without content. 17 
 Pure being is a strange kind of result for thinking. It is and only is 
the result of abstracting from all the contents captured by 'being' and yet 
the result in question is not anything one thinks, but empty thinking itself. 
 
                                                
16 This bears some resemblance to a 'conceptual rule' theory of concepts. On a 
conceptual rule theory, a concept is a rule for evaluating transitions between 
thoughts. The classic account of a conceptual rule theory of concepts in the 
'analytic' tradition can be found in Kripke (1982), who claims inspiration from 
Wittgenstein. A more recent account, also inspired by Wittgenstein can be found 
in Horwich (2012). Christopher Peacocke's conceptual rule theory is perhaps the 
most extensively developed in contemporary philosophy. It is developed in 
Peacocke (1992).  
17 Note, this needn’t counter Hegel’s claims to presuppositionlessness, since his 
demand is only that the first thought be without content. His demand was not 
that all processes of thinking themselves be abstracted from, negated. Then 
thinking would stop. No, — rather, we continue thinking, but not about 
anything. 
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§7 Pure nothing in the larger Logic 
So, the same with nothing. To think with the concept ‘nothing’ is to think 
of nothing. Again, it is the result of abstracting, only now we have the 
pure result, the characterisation not just of what one is not to think (i.e., 
anything) but also what one is to think (nothing). Here is the section on 
pure nothing from SL in full: 
 
Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality with itself, complete 
emptiness, absence of all determination and content—
undifferentiatedness in itself. In so far as intuiting or thinking can be 
mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or 
nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, 
a meaning; both are distinguished and thus nothing is (exists) in our 
intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and thought itself, 
and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, 
therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, 
and thus altogether the same as, pure being. (SL 21.69) 
 
Nothing is neither a concept of a particular something nor a concept of a 
kind of relation. On the level of content, it is void of any content just like 
‘pure being’. The concept ‘pure nothing’ is the concept of no content, of 
contentlessness. Given these symmetries with thinking pure being, the 
asymmetries in the relations are noteworthy. Hegel holds that nothing is 
'simple equality with itself' (A=A) and doesn't specify, in the way he does 
with being, that it is also not unequal with respect to another, ~(A≠B). This 
appears deliberate. 
 In the expositing of pure nothing, Hegel states that it is 'lack of all 
distinction within' (SL 21.69). Likewise pure being, Hegel says, 'has no 
difference within it' and states that '[i]f any determination or content were 
posited in it as distinct [...] it would thereby fail to hold fast to its purity' 
(SL 21.69). 
 Yet Hegel is seemingly careful to state of pure being that it also 
lacks outer differentiation: 'it has no difference within it, nor any 
outwardly' (SL 21.69). I have suggested this adds to the A=A self-equality 
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a ~(A≠B) self-equality. The addition is repeated in the following sentence: 
'[i]f any determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or if it were 
posited by this determination or content as distinct from an other, it would 
thereby fail to hold fast to its purity' (SL 21.69, emphasis added).  
 Twice, then, Hegel compliments a claim about its self-relation with 
one about an other-relation. Nothing, too, bears the same self-relation. As 
stated, pure nothing is like pure being 'simple equality with itself' (SL 
21.69), equality formalisable as A=A. Yet, the qualifications to pure being 
that add the ~(A≠B) structure are missing from the exposition of pure 
nothing. That Hegel omits this outward reference twice, yet ascribes the 
same self-relation twice suggests a deliberate decision to draw an explicit 
distinction between being and nothing. 
 So, as we have seen, thinking with ‘pure being’ and with ‘pure 
nothing’ is in both cases constitutively to think without content. Any 
thinking with content is not thinking with the concept ‘pure being’ or 
‘pure nothing’, since it does not count as ‘not thinking of anything’ (pure 
being) nor does it count as thinking nothing (pure nothing). Their content 
is not analysable into anything more basic. They have no constitutive 
content. Or, constitutively, they have no content. Both are empty, self-
identical thoughts. 
 Do we already have the unity of pure being and pure nothing here? 
Yes, they are the same, Hegel says in the sections from the Logic. 'Being, 
the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less 
than nothing' (SL 21.69). 'Nothing is therefore the same determination or 
rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as what 
pure being is' (SL 21.69). As such, ‘[t]he truth of being as well as nothing is 
therefore the unity of both’ (EL §88). — truth, that is, in that this is what 
they result in. 
 
This nothing that pure, indeterminate being itself proves to be is not 
just the nothingness to which we frequently refer in everyday 
discourse. We often say that there is ‘nothing’ in the bag or ‘nothing’ 
on television when what we mean is that the specific things we desire 
are not to be found and what there is is not what we are interested in. 
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Such everyday nothingness is merely the absence of this or that specific 
thing (say, a ball), that is at the same time the presence of something 
else (say, the air). By contrast, the nothingness Hegel has in mind in the 
Logic is the absolute ‘lack’ or ‘absence’ of anything at all, or sheer and 
utter nothing. (Houlgate, 2006: 264) 
 
In this sense, there is no difference between being and nothing. As 
Houlgate puts it, being ‘turns out to be’ nothing and Hegel claims that 
‘that pure being lacks all further determination’ but does not ‘define being 
as the explicit lack, absence, or negation of determinacy’ (Houlgate, 2006: 
82). This supports my view that, whilst thinking with the concept ‘being’ 
is not thinking of anything, thinking with the concept ‘nothing’ is thinking 
of nothing. This lack of determinacy defines pure being, which is pure 
indeterminacy. By contrast, nothing is defined as absolute absence of 
anything at all, without reference to this being an absence of determinacy. 
 
§8 Abstracting 
Above, I have referred to the act of abstraction. Hegel perhaps implores us 
to not put too much weight on his own references act of abstraction. Note 
the description of the being-nothing transition as ‘easy and trivial’ when 
one ‘remembers’ that being is the result of a perfect abstraction in the 
following passage: 
 
In being, when taken in that simplicity and immediacy, the memory 
that it is the result of a perfect abstraction, and that it is therefore 
already abstract negativity [i.e. already negatively mediated], nothing, 
is left back behind the science [...] With the recovery of this memory, it 
is possible to present the transition from being to nothing, or also, as it 
is said, to clarify it and make it comprehensible, as something itself easy 
and trivial. Of course, the being which is made into the beginning of 
science is a nothing, since it is possible to abstract from everything, and 
when abstraction is made from all, nothing is left over. (SL 21.86)18 
                                                




Yet, Hegel finds no problem with explaining transition in terms of the act 
of thinking rather than its content, as is clear in a comment on ‘nothing’. 
'[W]hether a beginning is made with the activity of nothing or with 
nothing is equally indifferent, for the activity of nothing, that is, the mere 
abstracting, is neither more nor less true than the mere nothing' (SL 21.87). 
As such, it is not just, as Hegel (rightly, I think) suggests easier to explain 
the moves in terms of the act of abstracting, but, as he also suggests, it 
makes no difference to the philosophical point. As it is simpler and it 




Houlgate reads the derivation of becoming as follows. 
 
[T]he thought of pure being slips away of its own accord into the 
thought of nothing, and the thought of nothing itself slips away into 
the thought of pure being, thereby generating the new thought of this 
very slippage or ‘vanishing,’ which Hegel names becoming. (2006: 52) 
 
According to Houlgate, then, becoming is just the concept of the 
vanishing. We should note, already, how different this appears to be from 
Trendelenburg’s account. How does movement come to be from resting 
representations? Houlgate’s answer is: the two thoughts vanish into one 
another. This surely is sufficient for a ‘process’ and so sufficient for 
movement. Movement is in becoming qua vanishing. 
 The point at which one goes from ‘not thinking about anything’ in 
being to thinking about nothing and vice-versa is a vanishing point. 
Thinking that counts as not thinking about anything already counts as 
thinking about nothing and vice-versa. There is no inference made to 
justify what is essentially a shift in emphasis, hence it is described as a 
                                                                                                                                          
sees this as no challenge to his point since nothing, on his account, vanishes into 
being. 
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‘vanishing’.19 ‘[T]he thought of pure being slips away of its own accord into 
the thought of nothing’ (Houlgate, 2006: 52). Or, as Hegel puts it, ‘[t]he 
concept of being is just this, that it is so simple as to vanish into its 
opposite immediately' (SL 12.33). The ground for this transition is more or 
less clear. Both have the same empty content.20 This has given us a better 
grasp of the following: 
 
Now this pure being is a pure abstraction and thus the absolutely negative 
which, when likewise taken immediately, is nothing. (EL §87) 
 
As thinking with ‘pure being’ is pure abstracting, not thinking about 
anything it is thinking about the absolutely negative and so counts as 
thinking nothing. According to one commentator, '[t]here is no secret 
lurking behind Hegel's assertion that "pure being" is "nothing". It simply 
means that what "being" (taken by itself) refers to is the same as what 
"nothing" (taken by itself) refers to, namely, [...] nothing' (Wolff, 2013: 88). 
On this reading, the identity is just that neither term refers to anything, 
which is the same as referring to nothing. 
 
Conversely, nothing, as this immediate, self-same, is likewise the same 
as being. (EL §88) 
 
The act of thinking the concept with ‘pure nothing’ equally slips back into 
that of thinking with ‘pure being’. As Houlgate puts it, ‘the thought of 
nothing itself slips away into the thought of pure being’ (Houlgate, 2006: 
52). I have opted for a different way of expressing it. As I have put it there 
is no thinking of pure being. As I put it, the thought of pure nothing slips 
away into not thinking of anything (the abstractive attempt to think pure 
being). 
 
                                                
19 Houlgate describes the move from being to nothing as a redefinition (Houlgate, 
2006: 95). Hegel does too in the Encyclopaedia. He calls nothing '[t]he second 
definition of the absolute' (EL §87). I have opted for different language. 
20 Cf. Beiser, 2013: 62; Houlgate, 2006: 42, 52. 
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§10 The intentional difference in vanishing 
As we saw, for Trendelenburg, pure being and pure nothing are at rest. 
'Das reine Sein, sich selbst gleich, ist Ruhe; das Nichts — das sich selbst 
Gleiche — ist ebenfalls Ruhe' (Trendelenburg, 1870: 38). 'Pure being, self-
same, is rest; nothing — the self-same — is also rest'. As stated, pure 
nothing is like pure being 'simple equality with itself' (SL 21.69), equality 
formalisable as A=A. Yet, the qualification to pure being that it is also 
~(A≠B) is missing from the exposition of pure nothing, as discussed in the 
section on nothing above. If this is as deliberate as it seems, one ought to 
think about the full implications of this for the transition from pure being 
to pure nothing (and back again), especially with respect to the sameness 
of the two categories to each other. 
 This already suggests some difference between pure being and 
nothing. Yet, as we saw, there can be no difference at the level of content 
(in content they are both the same, empty). I suggested relational features 
are not features of the content. Rather, they are features of the activity of 
thinking. ~(A≠B) qualifies A=A. No thinking about, just thinking (A=A), 
but not because it is detached from external content (A≠B), where B is any 
~A and so ~(A≠(~A)), but rather: ~(A≠B). This qualification is missing in 
‘nothing’. 
 
Placing the difference in thinking activity, not the content is supported by 
the idea of vanishing. In focussing on self-identity, Trendelenburg 
focusses on the ground of the unity of being and nothing, but not what 
Hegel takes this ground to bring about in thought, namely vanishing. 
Hegel claims that this unity has movement in the sense that there is the 
vanishing we’ve seen above. 
 
[T]he truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is 
rather that they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct yet 
equally unseparated and inseparable, and that each immediately 
vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore this movement of the 
immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement 
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in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has just 
as immediately dissolved itself. (SL 21.69-70) 
 
In avoiding the topic of vanishing, Trendelenburg thereby avoids the very 
feature that constitutes the movement of the unity and thereby makes it 
the concept becoming. Trendelenburg rejects the idea that this synthesis is 
movement because the unity of pure being and pure nothing is their self-
identity and a concept captures (has for its content, refers to) only that 
which shares its logical features. Yet the concept also involves vanishing. Is 
this not a feature of the logic of the concept? Does this not allow it to 
capture things like the dawning of the day? 
 I argue that insofar as we are reasoning about the content of pure 
being and pure nothing, Trendelenburg is right to say that being and 
nothing considered in their self-identity are insufficient for their synthesis 
to have movement. Trendelenburg’s conclusion is that, since movement is 
necessary for any becoming and becoming is only the unity of being and 
nothing, it is incorrect to describe the concept of their synthesis as a 
concept of becoming. Trendelenburg does not criticise the unity of being 
and nothing, but the origin of the difference required for a concept of 
movement. 
 Trendelenburg does not reference the indistinguishability of being 
and nothing. Yet this indistinguishability is necessary for the move to 
becoming. A crucial part of their transition into one another is their 
vanishing, as Houlgate has pointed out. Being vanishes. Its content turns 
out to be nothing — it has no determinacy. Nothing is this result of 
vanishing, which in turn vanishes because it is the content of pure being, it 
is. He therefore underplays the kind of unity that Hegel attributes to being 
and nothing. 
 I hold that Hegel does not need movement in the content of 
becoming. Firstly, the concept 'becoming' does not need it to effect the 
unity and difference of pure being and pure nothing that Hegel needs it to. 
Secondly, we who are trying to understand Hegel do not need it to 
understand how the concept of becoming develops further in the opening 
stages of the Logic. I hold that at the level of content being and nothing are 
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in becoming still indistinguishable. They are still contentless. The concept of 
the indistinguishability of being and nothing is that of the lack of content-
difference. 
 However, they are distinguishable at the level of the activity of 
thinking. Becoming is contentless, intention-laden thinking. It isn’t to be 
analysed into distinct moments of the content of being and nothing. There 
isn’t any distinction in content. Yet, I hold, there is a distinction at the level 
of ‘intention’, the activity of thinking with that concept. Trendelenburg 
underplays the role of the distinction in intention of being and nothing, 
which Hegel emphasises in his second remark on becoming. 
 Let us now look at the second remark to the section on becoming in 
the Logic. As Hegel says, not just any understanding of the unity of being 
and nothing will do. The unity is not, Hegel is keen to emphasise, the 
unity resulting from ‘subjective reflection’, not what ‘is normally taken as 
a connection that arises from comparison, from external reflection’ (SL 
21.78). That is because the latter ‘finds the same thing in two different 
subject matters’ (SL 21.78-79) and so 
 
a unity is there with respect to which complete indifference is 
presupposed on the part of the subject matters compared, so that the 
comparing and the unity do not touch these subject matters themselves 
but are rather a doing and a determining external to them. Unity [in 
the above sense] thus expresses a totally abstract sameness, and it will 
sound all the harsher and the more discordant the more the terms of 
which it is asserted show themselves to be utterly distinct. (SL 21.79) 
 
Unity through comparison masks over the differences between the things 
compared, whereas the kind of unity that being and nothing has, Hegel 
holds, is one that does not hide their difference. 
 
For this reason it would therefore be better to say simply 
unseparatedness and inseparability; but then the affirmative aspect of the 
connection of the whole would not be expressed. (SL 21.79) 
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Inseparability highlights that thinking inescapably counts as thinking with 
‘pure nothing’ when it thinks with ‘pure being’, and vice-versa. That is, 
thinking thinks with two contents simultaneously. Yet the identity of the 
content of these thoughts must also be expressed. Hegel goes on to say 
that, with respect to the unity of being and nothing, 
 
the whole true result that we have here before us is becoming, but a 
becoming which is not the merely one-sided or abstract unity of being 
and nothing. It consists rather in this movement, that pure being is 
immediate and simple and for that very reason is just as much pure 
nothing; that the distinction between them is, but equally sublates itself 
and is not. This result does also assert, therefore, the distinction of 
being and nothing, but it asserts it as one which is merely intended. (SL 
21.79) 
 
The second half of the quote above introduces two things we have not 
seen Trendelenburg acknowledge. Firstly, that the concepts ‘being’ and 
‘nothing’ and being and nothing relations constitute the concept 
‘becoming’. Since these relations aren’t mentioned in the Encyclopaedia, 
Hegel might take it to be an aspect of being constituted by the concepts of 
being and nothing — that is, that not just being is and nothing is not, but 
the distinction between them, too, both is and is not. We have already seen 
one sense in which this is true. Pure being is distinct from nothing in that 
the act of thinking it is is the activity of not thinking about anything but to 
think with ‘pure nothing’ is to think about some content. 
 On the other hand, this distinction ‘sublates itself’. The successful 
act of not thinking of anything is indistinguishable in content from the 
successful act of thinking of nothing. To be sure, we can identify the 
different emphases, but we cannot ground this in any difference in 
content. Not thinking of anything has no content, which is 
indistinguishable from the content ‘nothing’, which is sheer empty 
content. As Hegel puts it, ‘[t]his result does also assert, therefore, the 
distinctness of being and nothing, but it asserts it as one which is merely 
intended’ (SL 21.79). 
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 This means that the distinction is made by thinking alone yet in the 
absence of any difference in content. This is the second thing not discussed 
by Trendelenburg. In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel describes this distinction as 
‘mere opinion’ (EL §87R.), which captures the same thought. So, though 
simply identical at the level of content, pure being and pure nothing 
remain distinguished, without ground in the content, for thinking. As 
such, the difference between them still ‘is’, is not reduced away but on the 
other hand also ‘is’ not.  
 Maybe Trendelenburg read the mere intention of the difference as 
indicating its contingency. Or perhaps, though recognising the importance 
of the intended difference for Hegel, Trendelenburg rejects intended 
differences as relevant to the logical qualities of the concept. On 
Trendelenburg’s view, what matters is whether a concept can have 
movements as their content. Yet, the intention, whilst contingent to being 
and nothing, is not contingent to the vanishing. 
 We ought not to read the ‘intention’ here as though one is trying to 
make a distinction but failing to. The intelligibility of being is intended 
towards nothing in that this intelligibility is made up of nothing at all, and 
this produces a distinction between the two. However, since all being is is 
this nothingness, then there is also no distinction in content. It seems that 
the intelligibility of this becoming just is the intelligibility of this kind of 
unity of being and nothing. Becoming is just a movement in the sense that 
it depends on a being-nothing identity and difference. It is thus not 
introduced as a third thought, a third kind of content but rather is akin to 
turning back to look at the activity with the content. 
 Hegel insists, however, that the unity of being and nothingness—
what both is and is not—consists in both their sameness and their 
difference, in their being the same in having nothing to distinguish them, 
and in their being different because one is the negation of the other 
(Beiser, 2013: 62). The difference in intention is, on Beiser’s reading, a 
difference of negation. To be nothing is the same as being the negation of 
being. That is, ‘to be nothing’ = ‘to not be’. Likewise, to be being is the 
same as being the negation of nothing: ‘to be being’ is not distinguished 
from ‘to be’. 
 44 
 In any case, the result is that being and nothing are contraries that 
are indistinguishable in content. The ground of their contrariety cannot 
possibly be the content. 
 Hegel’s claim is that it ‘it makes a difference whether something or 
nothing is being intuited or thought’ (21.69). The thought here seems to be 
as follows. We are still bound by the obligation in the act of abstraction to 
not think any content when thinking nothing. Therefore, the act of 
abstracting demands we distinguish between cases where we are thinking 
something (some content) and thinking nothing. 
 The distinction is that of the content during the act of thinking, the 
activity and the content at the result of thinking. Insofar as one is thinking 
something, one has not completed the abstraction to pure nothing. Yet 
insofar as one has completed it, one is thinking nothing, the result. 
Therefore, the act of abstraction itself demands we make a distinction. 
Therefore, ‘nothing’ is a definite or determinate content. It is different 
from being and so it is determinate. Then it must be abstracted away from, 
and so we return to the act of abstraction, attempting to reach pure being, 
and yet that results in nothing, and so on. As Hegel later puts it, though, 
the distinction between pure being and nothing is 'merely intended' (SL 
21.75 and 21.79). As such, the definite difference introduced is not between 
pure being and pure nothing’s content, but in the activity of thinking, or in 
determining itself. 
 Hegel allows concepts to be different in their intention as well as 
content. Indeed, Hegel thinks that with the concept of being, 'we can only 
intend it without being able to say what it is' (SL 12.33). Though its content 
is nothing, it can still be 'intended' as being. Intending is here to be 
understood as the direction of thought, its coming to be about something. 
The claim that being can be intended but we cannot say what it is thus 
seems like the claim that thought grasps being in its coming to be about, 
but it does not grasp being as its object of thought, as the content of 
thought.21 
                                                
21 I talk about intending in abstraction from intentional content here. I see it as the 
whole point of presuppositionless logic that no affirmative claims are made 
about the content, but rather that the act of abstraction itself is slowly thought 
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 The difference thinking being or thinking nothing makes is internal 
to the act of abstracting, to the intending — but not to the content. If one is 
abstracting and thinks something then one must abstract further, but if 
one thinks nothing then one need not do so. Both thoughts vanish into 
each other, but the difference between them remains and maintains this 
becoming. 
 
As Houlgate, says, Hegel holds that 
 
absolute, radical nothingness has its own immediacy. After all, it is 
sheer and utter nothingness and as such is intelligible to thought. 
Nothingness is, indeed, nothing but the sheer immediacy of nothingness 
itself; there is nothing else to it. As this immediacy, Hegel contends, it 
is indistinguishable from pure indeterminate being. This is not to say 
that we are mistaken to think of it as nothing in the first place. Pure 
nothing is nothing whatsoever, but it is so purely and immediately 
nothing that it vanishes logically into empty immediate being. Just as 
pure being vanishes logically into nothing, therefore, pure nothing 
equally vanishes logically back into being. This means, of course, that 
pure being and pure nothing not only vanish but also prove to be 
ineliminable since each one disappears into, and so immediately 
revives, the other. (2006: 264). 
 
The instability of the definitions of being and nothing constitutes their 
necessity or ineliminability. This instability is the result of simultaneously 
being a replacement and an effect and cause of the other definition. This 
simultaneity constitutes the necessity of being with respect to nothing and 
                                                                                                                                          
through, its implications drawn out. I take myself to be in no conflict with 
Houlgate’s claim that the Logic involves drawing out the determinations of being, 
but the difference is that I trace these movements at the level of the act of 
thinking which, to me, is more intelligible, and Hegel, as I have shown, suggests 
there is no difference in tracing the movements in terms of the background act of 
abstraction or in terms of the logical content itself. In the absence of any reason to 
think otherwise, I suppose this to be constant throughout the Logic. 
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vice-versa. This necessity is contingent on the act of purification via 
abstraction. This account leaves us with some puzzles.  
 Firstly, the account doesn’t make adequate sense of the move from 
nothing to being. Hegel says that ‘nothing is’, which seems to be more 
than to say that they are indistinguishable — an epistemic quality. Rather, 
it seems to say that nothing possesses being — an ontological quality. 
 The account doesn’t make sense of the ontological side of their 
indistinguishability. It is not that nothing possesses being, but that not 
being determinate and not being are different, though the same in content. 
Pure thought is sensitive to this difference. Yet the ontological side of their 
indistinguishability is essential to the move from nothing to being. 
 There is a difference between the Encyclopaedia Logic and the Science 
of Logic on the transition from nothing to being. In the former, Hegel does 
suggest that the move from nothing to being has the same structure as the 
move from being to nothing: they are indistinguishable. In the Science of 
Logic, by contrast, it is not their indistinguishableness that marks the move 
back from nothing to being, it is that ‘nothing is’, a stronger claim. In a 
remark, Hegel clarifies what this proposition, that nothing is, means:  
 
[w]hen taken in its immediacy, nothing shows itself as existing; for it is 
by nature the same as being. Nothing is thought of, represented; it is 
spoken about; it therefore is. (SL 21.88) 
 
Hegel is clear on the ontological implications of this argument, however: 
‘nothing has its being in thinking, representing, speaking, etc.' (SL 21.88).22 
As I put it, nothing has being qua content. Hegel's explanation of this is 
that nothing can have being qua content because it is the content of being 
('for it is by nature the same as being’). I hold the ontological side of the 
                                                
22 According to Hegel, when this fact is held together with (1) the thought that 
pure being and pure nothing are absolutely opposed (not synthesised, in the 
context of the passage I'm referring to) and (2) that the thinking of pure being 
moves into the thinking of pure nothing, it follows that the result of thinking 
pure being is 'mere semblance and opinion', which he takes to explain in what 
sense Parmenides is justified in holding that pure being cannot be spoken about 
(SL 21.85). 
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indistinguishability to be essential to the move from nothing to being in 
the Science of Logic. That nothing is is an ontological claim — about content 
— distinct from the act-level claim that nothing is indistinguishable from 
being. 
 The indistinguishability of being and nothing is not a given or an 
epistemic fact. The indistinguishability applies to the act of thinking pure 
being and pure nothing. Following from these act-level claims is an 
ontological content-level claim. The account above makes clear what kind 
of change from being into nothing and vice-versa is at hand. The account 
says how indistinguishability of content allows for an idea of (1) difference 
and (2) the relevant change that is at least partly constituted by that 
difference. It is a change of intention, of what thinking is doing. The 
concept in whose content being and nothing are indistinguishable is 
becoming. 
 According to Di Giovanni, 
 
[t]o determine an object in becoming [...] one must begin by taking back 
whatever one might say of it prima facie as a would-be fixed 
determination of it; in this sense, therefore, one begins with a ‘not’, or 
from ‘nothing’. (Di Giovanni, 2013: 258) 
 
On this account, becoming furthers the 'act of abstraction' at work in 
producing the thoughts of being and nothing. I agree with this approach. 
As I understand it, becoming is the most general kind of movement in 
Hegel’s system. Movement (becoming) is, at the act-level, a kind of 
replacement of one form of activity of thought (being) with another 
(nothing). It is the replacement of the act of abstraction with a result. The 
replacement in question is such that the necessary consequence of the first 
form’s content is a second form (in this case because it has the same 
content) but the second form in turn is necessarily replaced with the first 
form. The two contents are indistinguishable. 
 Yet, the following situation arises: a difference between pure 
being’s form and its content. Pure being has no content via abstraction. 
Pure being’s form has no content. It is empty. It is not what it is. This is 
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necessary because otherwise the being is not pure. There is thus a necessary 
difference between it and its content. It thinks being away into nothing. If 
the content of pure being is pure nothing, one can say two things. Firstly, 
that pure being’s content is indistinguishable from pure nothing. 
Secondly, that they are nonetheless different in intention. One negatively 
thinks (i.e., arrives via abstraction at) nothing. One positively thinks (i.e., 
about) nothing. That is, the difference is not in the end of the intending but 
in how thought gets there. 
 But couldn’t one have nothingness that is not the content of being 
but simple nothing? Yes, but, as I understand it, Hegel doesn’t accept this 
as a result. Does nothing have its own form? If it did, then nothing would 
have some kind of being (which is Hegel’s own argument at SL 21.86-87). 
And its form, as the form without content would be indistinguishable 
from that of pure being. Thus, if pure being has content, that content is 
nothing. If pure nothing has a form, it is only pure being, not the being of a 
thing — it is no thing. Insofar as nothing has a rational form, it is thus 
necessarily that of its opposing form — pure being. As such, nothing is. 
 This situation produces a contradiction. Being and nothing are 
indistinguishable in content and form. Yet they are distinct in intention. 
This contradiction is sublated by a further concept. This concept must be 
capable of combining the distinct meanings of being and nothing with 
their indistinguishability. As a condition of immanent development, this 
further concept must not contain any other meaning (Wolff, 2013: 88). 
Becoming — the inseparability of the pure being form and pure nothing 
content in the act of abstraction.23 Recall that this concept must meet the 
criterion that it contain no other meaning than what is contained in being 
and nothing. Then it is clear that becoming can have no temporal meaning 
at this stage.24 Becoming, as I understand it, is the inherent vanishing in the 
act of abstraction. 
                                                
23 According to one commentator, this is the introduction of a concept from 
Newton's differential calculus (his 'method of fluxions'), there named as fieri 
(Wolff, 2013: 89). 
24 Time is a kind of becoming for Hegel. It is 'intuited becoming' (PN §258). This 
must be drawn out of it through connecting it to other categories, though. It is 
not a temporal category as such. 
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§11 Thinking activity 
On the view I have presented thus far, that which makes ‘becoming’ an 
adequate concept, able to capture movement is not that it is about 
movement but that thinking is moving. To think with the concept 
becoming is for thought to move. The movement is plausibly between the 
two ways of thinking identified above. The content is the same in both 
ways. It is not enough to distinguish them. Yet it is arrived at or captured 
in two different ways. So, though the content does not change and neither 
does the fact that it can be considered with two thinking forms, the 
content does change from being considered under one form to being 
considered under another. 
 This shows how important attention to the process of thinking is to 
grasping Hegel’s dialectic, not just the content thought about. Attention to 
the content alone leaves us unable to respond to Trendelenburg. I thus 
seem to agree with Fischer. According to Fischer, in Beiser’s terms, 
Trendelenburg’s ‘interpretation had focused on the content of the 
concepts; but it had crucially ignored the act of thinking behind them’ 
(Beiser, 2013: 110). Trendelenburg held that there was no successful, 
purely a priori derivation of becoming. He held this because the content of 
the concepts of being and nothing captures self-identity and no relation 
between opposites, so no being-nothing movement, just being or nothing. 
So, his interpretation focussed on the content. 
 However, he did not look at the act of thinking behind being and 
nothing. Trendelenburg only looked at the content of thought. Yet Hegel’s 
argument depends for its validity on shifts in the act of thinking and that 
is where the required non-identity can be introduced. On Fischer’s view, 
this act of thinking is the act of abstracting of the subject thinking the logic 
and that same subject’s self-observation (Beiser, 2013: 110). Considered in 
this way, Fischer takes the derivation of becoming to be successful. One 
can derive becoming from being and nothing. 
 As Trendelenburg acknowledges, one can derive the difference of 
being and nothing from the experience of something changing, a posteriori. 
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He does not question that if we begin with the concept of becoming, 
we can analyse it into the concepts of being and nothingness. Since 
something in becoming both is and is not in some respects, the analysis 
of the concept of becoming will indeed ultimately involve the concepts 
of being and nothingness. (Beiser, 2013: 62) 
 
Yet Fischer holds that one can derive becoming from the experience of 
one’s thinking agency alone, irrespective of the content of thought, and so a 
priori. 
 Fischer holds that the experience of contentless thinking agency is 
that the thinking agent both is and is not. I have this experience, then I 
don’t have that experience. Yet this being and nothing of the thinking agent 
are only possible when synthesised in the ‘I’, and this ‘I’ is undergoing 
becoming. So, Fischer holds that the experience of contentless thinking 
agency just is the experience of pure becoming. He finds some textual 
support in passages from Hegel such as §21 of the preface to the 
Phenomenology where Hegel says that ‘[t]he I, or becoming, this act of 
mediating, is, precisely in terms of its simplicity, immediacy in the process 
of becoming and is the immediate itself’ (§21). The I is becoming. Namely, 
its immediacy is becoming. 
 Trendelenburg’s retort is that Fischer’s argument does not deal 
with pure being and pure nothing but the being and nothing of a thinking 
agent (Beiser, 2013: 109-111). The argument depends upon the idea of a 
determinate something that has being and nothing and thereby must 
undergo becoming. Yet this is different from the argument that being and 
nothing are necessary and sufficient for becoming and it is so in two ways. 
 Firstly, it does not start by considering being and nothing on their 
own terms and then develops them into their unity. Rather, it starts by 
thinking of them in a relation and holds that relation can only hold if they 
are already unified.  Yet, on Trendelenburg’s account being and nothing 
are thinkable independently of becoming and then shown to be unified in 
a third concept: becoming. For Fischer, the thoughts of being and nothing 
are only possible with the becoming of thinking and thinking’s self-
recognition of that in the concept ‘becoming’. 
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 Secondly, being is considered as the being of the thinking agent, not 
as such. Whilst thinking is not of any of its explanatory content, still when 
we think or reflect on that being we have that agent in mind, the agency is 
part of the content of the reflecting agent’s thought. Yet, on Trendelenburg’s 
account, being at the beginning of the Logic is pure, unlike the being of a 
particular agent. 
 Trendelenburg is right to reject Fischer’s account on the grounds 
just given. As Houlgate has suggested, Hegel’s method is immanent only 
if transitions are made only because of the content of thinking and the 
features of that content, not features of the experience of thinking itself. 
 However, the activity of thinking is not thereby without a role in 
the transitions. As Houlgate notes, 
 
[t]here appears [...] to be some evidence to support the general view 
that speculative logic is moved from one category to another by the 
activity of the philosopher rather than the categories themselves. 
(Houlgate, 2006: 273) 
 
The evidence Houlgate points to is the following: 
 
[Pure being and nothing seem to be,] as Jacobi correctly describes 
them, results of abstraction; they are expressly determined as 
indeterminate — and this, to go back to their simplest form, is being. 
This indeterminateness is however precisely what constitutes their 
determinateness. For indeterminateness is opposed to determinateness; 
as opposed, it is therefore itself something determinate or negative — 
the pure, entirely abstract negative. This indeterminateness or abstract 
negation which thus has being in it is that to which reflection, whether 
external or internal, gives voice when it equates such a being with 
nothing, when it declares it to be an empty product of thought, a 
nothingness. (SL 21.85-86) 
 
As Houlgate notes, this suggests that 
 
 52 
we move from the thought of pure being to that of nothing only 
because reflection experiences pure being as vacuous, not because pure 
being logically converts itself into nothing. (Houlgate, 2006: 273) 
 
That is, it suggests that the transition is made not because of some positive 
feature of the content but because of the thinker's experience of that 
content. Yet, Houlgate disagrees with this reading. For Houlgate, pure 
being becomes nothing independently of the individual’s experience of 
thinking about pure being. According to Houlgate, second-order thinking, 
thinking about thinking about pure being (about reflection’s experience of 
pure being, as Houlgate puts it) is incompatible with thinking pure being 
since such second-order thinking involves a determinate thinker and 
experience in the content of thought and there is no determinate content in 
the thought of pure being. 
 Only features of pure being (the sole one of which is 
‘indeterminacy’) can serve as an immanent ground for being becoming 
nothing. For Houlgate, these discussions about reflection’s experience are 
descriptive, but they do not account for the agency in the Logic, what is 
active and moves itself. According to Houlgate, the categories have a kind 
of agency themselves: they move themselves into other categories. My 
focus on the activity of thinking in this essay, by contrast, makes it seem 
like I hold that the transition is made because of features of the thinker, 
who I consider to be the agential force, rather than the content of thought. 
 I have emphasised the act of abstraction in my exegesis of the 
opening stages of the Logic and I have spoken less than Houlgate about the 
featurelessness of pure being as responsible for it becoming nothing. 
Instead, I have spoken of the intention to think pure being, the conditions 
for successfully doing so, and the resulting featurelessness being nothing. 
That is, on my reading pure being is the intended result of the act of 
abstraction, but the result is actually the thought of nothing. The thought 
of pure being is an ideal for thought that is pursued only in the process of 
abstracting from determinate beings and never achieved, rather resulting 
in its opposite. 
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 On this reading, the transition from being to nothing is still made 
because of the content of thinking and not because of any thought about 
an individual thinker’s thought of being. Nor is it made because of a 
general feature of thinking about pure being. That would still be to think 
about something determinate: thinking as opposed to being. As the 
reasoning goes within the Logic, the transition is simple: purely 
indeterminate being is indistinguishable, except in language, from 
nothing. My explanation of the transition in terms of the act of abstraction 
does not seek to replace this explanation, but to better understand the 
concept ‘pure being’ in the first place and to use this to better understand 
the concept ‘becoming’ through a better understanding of what thinking is 
like such that it becomes. 
 On Trendelenburg’s reading, becoming is inextricably linked to 
spatiotemporal experience25 such that Hegel’s concept ‘becoming’ can only 
be intelligible in reference to such experience. I seek to provide an 
explanation that satisfies Trendelenburg on some levels without 
conceding that becoming is illegitimately imported into the being-nothing 
unity. I hold the content of thinking to be the ground26 of every transition 
and the movement to take place because of thinking’s intentional activity: 
the movement might be that of thinking, but its direction is provided only 
by the content. 
 I try to give an account of the opening of the Logic in terms of the 
activity of thinking. I also argue that becoming is ‘in’ thinking. So, 
similarly to Fischer, I hold that agency is the locus of becoming, not 
categories themselves. Trendelenburg holds that ‘pure being’ and 
‘nothing’ are static concepts and therefore that the resulting becoming 
must come from without the content of thought. I agree, but I suggest this 
does not violate the terms of the Logic. I don’t invoke the temporality of 
agency to explain the Logic’s becoming as Fischer does. One need only 
invoke what Hegel himself says: that thinking is active in the Logic. 
 Trendelenburg holds that spatiotemporal experience is the only 
other source of the becoming. I turn to the activity of thinking, which is a 
                                                
25 Discussed in the next section. 
26 Without reference to the discussion of grounding in the ‘Doctrine of Essence’. 
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kind of dynamism that is already permitted in the opening stage of the 
Logic, albeit not at the level of content. On my reading, we must 
distinguish between thinking about the activity of thinking about being, 
which is illegitimate due to its determinacy, and engaging in this activity 
of thinking about being, which is clearly not illegitimate if the Logic is to be 
followed at all. The content of the Logic does not need to be supplemented 
with a discussion of the act of abstraction. I accept the sufficiency of the 
thought of pure being for that of pure nothing and vice-versa. 
(Trendelenburg also accepts it for the sake of argument.)  
 However, if we hold that pure being and pure nothing are 
indeterminate thoughts, there must be a ground for distinguishing them 
other than the content of those thoughts (no feature of those thoughts can 
help, since there are none) and so it must be in the thinking itself and not 
its content, if it is to remain presuppositionless. Looking at the act of 
abstraction and the role of ‘intention’ in Hegel’s discussion of the Logic is 
my primary means for identifying how pure being and pure nothing can 
be distinguished other than in mere words.  
 The sense in which there is movement in the Logic or, perhaps more 
accurately expressed, where the movement in the Logic is, is: it’s ‘in’ 
thinking. Movement requires distinction and the first movement of the 
Logic is contingent on a distinction made not in the content of thinking but 
in thinking’s intention. However, Houlgate’s objection to this is that it 
depends on the ‘effort on the part of the philosopher to employ or render 
determinate and intelligible the category of being' and that without this 
effort thinking ‘would forever remain that of pure being' (Houlgate, 2006: 
273).  
 This objection is a more determinate form of that against thinking 
about the individual thinker. There the objection rested on the thinker or 
even thinking in general being determinate, whereas pure being must be 
entirely indeterminate. This objection is against the view that the 
indeterminacy of pure being is a reason for transition because 
indeterminacy is not determinate and the unintelligibility of pure nothing is 
a reason for transition because unintelligibility is not intelligible. That is, 
this objection is against the view that pure being and pure nothing are 
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measured and found inadequate by standards (determinacy and 
intelligibility, respectively) and this counts as a presupposition since it is a 
standard of evaluating external to what the category is. My reading does not 
violate this, since the act of abstraction’s standard of evaluation is simply 
indeterminacy, a content-level standard determined by and only by what 
pure being is. 
 On Fischer’s view, the reason for the transition from being to 
nothing is apparent in an agent’s reflection on thinking about being. On 
Houlgate’s view, the reason for the transition is apparent in direct 
reflection on being itself. Fischer, then, takes the second-order approach 
and Houlgate the first-order approach. For Fischer, the agency of selfhood 
is necessary to the transition from being to nothing and is the basic 
dynamism identified by the concept ‘becoming’. Yet Trendelenburg and 
Houlgate are right to reject the role of determinate being as grounding the 
opening moves of the Logic on the grounds that selfhood is determinate 
(see Beiser, 2013: 110). 
 However, this doesn’t mean that the agency of selfhood plays no 
role in the opening moves of the Logic. These first moves are dependent 
upon the self actively abstracting from determinate being and in 
performing this act of abstraction from all determinate being, it is thinking 
pure being, but in its result it is thinking nothing. To interrogate becoming 
it is vital to figure out the move from nothing to becoming. Why not just end 
with nothing? My way of explaining this is that there remains, despite the 
lack of internal difference in becoming, a difference internal to the process 
of thinking nothing, which is the difference between the intention to think 
pure being in the act of abstraction and the resulting thought of nothing. 
 This, in turn, allows the concept 'becoming' the intrinsic 
differentiation that is required, on Trendelenburg’s terms, for movement 
to be possible. This doesn’t import thinking into the content of thought, 
since this difference between the intention and the result of thinking is not 
something thought about but rather a feature of the thinking. My claim, 
then, is that in this case it is not simply the content of thinking that is 
responsible for the transition but a feature of the thinking of that content. I 
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thereby have to reject the claim that all transitions in the Logic are because 
of the features of the content. 
 However, I can retain the view that they are immanent transitions, 
because it is not necessitated by anything other than the thinking of pure 
being. The internal difference is something thinking with the concept 
'nothing' has, even if it cannot be what it is about (there is no internal 
difference in the content). This source of internal difference is one that 
Trendelenburg does not consider and one that thereby sidesteps his core 
objection that movement cannot be derived from pure being and/or pure 
nothing. 
 
We need the idea of the activity of the act of abstraction to distinguish 
between being something and nothing on my reading. At the level of the 
act of abstraction (which is the same as the level of the act of negativity) 
there is thinking turning from negatively intending being-content to 
positively intending the nothing at which it arrives. 
 Hegel argues that pure being and pure nothing are 
indistinguishable in content, distinct in intention, and thereby 
inseparable.27 It is their inseparability emphasised that characterises their 
unity. My argument in this essay is that when this inseparability is 
partnered with a distinction of some kind, the relation of the terms has 
movement. The distinction in becoming is a distinction of 'intention' or 
'mere opinion' (EL §87R) and so the movement of becoming is contingent 
on the role of mere intention or opinion. There is no distinction at the level 
of content. As such, there is no movement at the level of content alone. 
 
§12 Things changing 
Let’s look at how Hegel introduces becoming, according to Beiser:  
 
                                                
27 In the second remark to the discussion of becoming, Hegel will suggest that 
‘unity’ has the wrong connotations. The unity of pure being and pure nothing 
excludes their disunity. 'Inseparability' is better because it does not exclude their 
disunity. 
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The truth of being and nothingness is becoming. This is because 
whatever becomes both is and is not; it is the movement by which 
being turns into nothingness, and by which nothingness turns into 
being (Beiser, 2013: 62)  
 
On my reading, becoming is, at the level of the act of thinking, the coming 
to be of the act of abstraction in its intention only, before it reaches any 
content.28 On my account, it is that very act through which abstraction is 
made. 
 As Beiser articulates it above, the argument turns on a concept of 
being turning into nothing and nothing into being. Becoming is the change 
of being into nothing and vice-versa. When my tree becomes ash, it 
changes from being a tree to not being a tree and, in not being a tree, being 
ash. Or when the forest becomes baron, it goes from not being baron to 
being so. Yet a concept of change seems to depend upon the idea of a 
difference between how things were and how things are. 
 Change is not a good model for making sense of the 
indistinguishability at hand, for (1) indistinguishability requires there to 
be no grounds for discernment, whereas in change the difference between 
how things were and how things are is the ground for discernment; (2) the 
being in change is determinate being, being a particular something (being 
the forest). Beiser suggests that Trendelenburg is sensitive to precisely this 
point when he defines change as 'the concept of something becoming 
different than it was' (Beiser, 2013: 44). 
 If this is what Beiser's Trendelenburg takes change to be, then he 
recognises points (1) and (2) above as features of change and must, if being 
faithful to Hegel's text, not then take being's 'turning into' nothingness nor 
nothingness's 'turning into' being to be change.  
 Trendelenburg says that, in response to his objections, 'one can say 
and will say that [...] the movement of outer nature is itself different from 
the movement of inner thought’ (Trendelenburg, 1870: 39). Yet, he 
continues, 'if this will be asserted, then the difference would have to be 
                                                
28 As we will see later, content can be of two kinds: other or self. 
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stated — this has happened nowhere' (Trendelenburg, 1870: 39). What 
Trendelenburg here considers is the possibility that his objections rest on 
assessing the concept 'becoming' as if it were a concept of the movement 
we find in nature. Indeed, he indicates this in the text. 
 Becoming could never become out of being and not-being, if the 
representation of becoming did not come before. Out of pure being, an 
acknowledged abstraction, and out of nothingness, also an acknowledged 
abstraction, becoming, this concrete intuition commanding life and death, 
cannot emerge. (Trendelenburg, 1870: 38) 
 For Trendelenburg, the concept 'becoming' can only be a concept of 
the kind of movement that we find in spatiotemporal intuition. He 
acknowledges that an objector will assert that the concept of the 
movement of pure thinking is a concept of a different kind of movement 
than that which we find in spatiotemporal intuition. Yet, he says, nobody 
has stated this difference. Nobody has given an adequate account of the 
difference. 
 The argument I have presented sets the basis for responding to a 
challenge implied in Trendelenburg's text. My strategy is not to argue for 
a different kind of movement to that found in spatiotemporal intuition. As 
stated in the opening sections of this essay, it is the same concept 
instantiated in thinking and in reality. However, I argue for a related 
difference. I argue that the concept 'becoming' is moving not in the sense 
that it is intuited as moving. Or, in the terms in which I have put it above, 
it is not moving in the sense that acquiring or using that concept 
constitutively involves a mental activity (whether thinking or intuiting or 
whatever) that is about some movement. Rather, it is that using this 
concept is a movement. 
 As such, the difference between the movement of outer nature and 
the movement of inner nature is not to be stated. However, the difference 
between movement of things thought about and thought moving is to be 
emphasised. This could the form basis for establishing a distinction 
between the movement of outer nature and that of inner thinking. Time, 
Hegel says, in the Philosophy of Nature is (and only is) 'intuited becoming’:  
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[i]t is the being which, in that it is, is not, and in that it is not, is. It is 
intuited becoming. (PN §258) 
  
If becoming is the most general sense of movement, one can say that 
insofar as movement in its most general sense is in the content of thinking, 
then this movement is time. The most general sense in which movement 
can be the content of thinking is time. The most general sense in which 
movement can be the form of thinking is becoming. Thus, when 
Trendelenburg or a follower objects that the concept ‘becoming’ is not 
about the becoming we know from intuition and holds this to exemplify a 
restriction on the system as a whole, the response is to be that the Logic is 
the wrong place to look. 
 The becomings they are looking for can be found elsewhere in the 
system. I won't have the space to develop these ideas further in this essay, 
but they point towards ways in which the ideas found here will be 
developed further. This won't placate adherents to Trendelenburg's 
understanding of what the concept 'becoming' requires. I have argued that 
Hegel and Trendelenburg demand different things of the concept 
'becoming'. Insofar as I have only shown that Hegel's demands for this 
concept are different to Trendelenburg's, I have not shown that Hegel 
meets Trendelenburg's demands. Indeed, I have accepted that he can’t. 
 I have accepted that Hegel's concept 'becoming' cannot be a concept 
of movement in the way Trendelenburg seems to demand it to be. 
However, in seeing how Hegel can respond to Trendelenburg, we have 
gained a more precise understanding of what sense 'becoming' has in the 
system with respect to movement. We have seen that ‘becoming’ is a 
concept with movement, namely the movement of thinking, but it is not a 
concept of movement. This can be used to clarify some of Hegel's uses of 
'becoming' in the system and mark the beginning of an attempt to address 
some of the questions outlined above. 
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Part II  
Senses of Movement 
§13 Introduction to the different senses of movement 
This is a constructive account of the senses of movement to be found in the 
following key passage from the Phenomenology’s preface: 
 
Science may organise itself only through the proper life of the concept. 
The determinateness which was taken from the schema and externally 
stuck onto existence is in science the self-moving soul of the content 
which has been brought to fruition. On the one hand, the movement of 
‘what is’ consists in becoming an other to itself and thus becoming its 
own immanent content; on the other hand, it takes this unfolding back 
into itself, that is, it takes its existence back into itself, which is to say, it 
makes itself into a moment, and it simplifies itself into 
determinateness. (Phen. §53, translation modified) 
 
I will try to draw a distinction between movement understood in three 
different ways. I consider these to be three different aspects of movement 
and as such, the same movement can instantiate all three. 
 The first is that of pure movement. This is the gerund qua verb: 
falling, reaching, etc. When this verb is ‘thinking’, I have called this an act-
level interpretation. The second is that of ‘becoming other’. This can be 
expressed with a gerund in its nominal form. That is, it is expressed as a 
gerund with a noun identifying that to which the movement identified by 
the gerund relates. For instance, reaching for the pen, falling to the ground. 
When the gerund is ‘thinking’, the noun identifies the content of thinking. 
For instance, thinking about my day, thinking through a problem, or 
thinking of something. It is this which is identified in an ‘act-level’ reading 
of Hegel’s logic of the kind I have offered above in terms of the act of 
abstraction. 
 There is also becoming other, where the noun identifies something 
distinct from the movement identified with the gerund. Thinking about my 
day is ‘becoming other’, since it is a movement or becoming (thinking) that 
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comes to a rest in something other than that thinking (my day). It is thus 
‘other’ in two ways. Firstly, the concept of that identified with the gerund 
is distinct from the concept of that identified with the noun. Secondly, as 
just stated, the gerund identifies an ongoing process and the noun attached 
to it identifies something other than a process. When the gerund is 
‘thinking’ the noun is classed as ‘content’. It is what thinking is about. In 
this case, (1) the concepts of thinking and the content are still distinct and 
(2) the content of thinking is different to the act of thinking. 
 Self-movement is the third kind of movement. Self-movements are 
articulated just like ‘becoming other’. However, in self-movement the 
gerund identifies the process whereby that which is identified by the noun 
comes to be. Examples of this include ‘growing of the tree’, ‘development 
of the idea’, and ‘constructing the house’. It is a self-movement because the 
movement constitutes the result of the movement. This is not the case in 
‘reaching for the pen’ or ‘falling to the ground’. Reaching does not 
constitute the pen. Falling does not constitute the ground. When the 
gerund of a proposition expressing self-movement is ‘thinking’, the noun 
identifies a thought. In ‘thinking a thought’, there is self-movement in that 
‘thinking’ refers to the process that constitutes the result of thinking, its 
content (the thought). 
 
§14 Pure movement 
Any gerund in its verbal form (abstracted from a noun), is a movement. 
Take a movement such as the ink falling to the ground. ‘Falling’ alone is a 
movement. Thus, the ink and its destination are not necessary for 
identifying the ink falling to the ground as a movement. The tree 
becoming ash is a movement. However, the ‘becoming’ alone is 
movement. One need not make reference to (1) what S is becoming F or (2) 
what F S is becoming. ‘Becoming’ alone is a movement. Concepts of 
movement are intelligible independently of the thing moving or the result 
of the movement. Becoming, Hegel says, is the equilibrium of coming and 
ceasing to be (SL 21.93). 
 The account of becoming in the Science of Logic makes many 
references to otherness. Of being and nothing, Hegel says, 
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each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore this 
movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other. (SL 
21.69) 
 
‘[B]eing and nothing are each unseparated from its other' (SL 21.92), 'each 
is in their distinguishedness a unity with the other' (SL 21.93). There is 
otherness not only at the level of the ‘parts’ of becoming, but also in its 
internal relations. ‘The one is ceasing-to-be; being passes over into nothing 
[...] This coming-to-be is the other direction’ (SL 21.93). In the sublation of 
becoming, the concept of becoming will be shown to have a result. This 
result is the existent or Dasein — what Hegel calls a 'quiescent unity' (SL 
21.93). This result is other than the becoming. It is stable. 
 Yet, as Hegel discusses how this quiescent unity emerges it turns 
out that the becoming that we have been looking at did not count as the 
simple unity of pure being and pure nothing. What was established in 
becoming was merely the vanishing of being into nothing and back into 
being (coming to be) or the vanishing of nothing into being and back into 
nothing (ceasing to be). This vanishing never constituted a positive, restful 
unity of being and pure nothing that Trendelenburg, for instance, 
supposes. The unity was only the vanishing, only the movement, which 
did not count as a simple, restful unity. That restful unity only comes 
about in Dasein, which is becoming’s ‘other’. 
 As Hegel puts it, difference is key: 
 
[B]ecoming is the vanishing of being into nothing, and of nothing into 
being, and the vanishing of being and nothing in general; but at the 
same time it rests on their being distinct. It therefore contradicts itself 
in itself, because what it unites within itself is self-opposed; but such a 
union destroys itself. (SL 21.93-94) 
 
As I understand it, the 'union [that] destroys itself' is the negative and 
thereby unrestful unity of vanishing. It is unrestful in the sense that the 
unity is only captured in a process of thought with different moments, not 
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a single thought. Yet, as we have seen, vanishing does not occur at the 
level of content. At the level of content we only have empty content. The 
vanishing, as I have presented it, is just the shift in emphasis between the 
two forms of thinking that one content. Now, as we have seen above, I 
follow Houlgate in holding that this shift is because of the nature of the 
content itself (namely, its emptiness) and so I remain committed to the 
immanent reading of the Logic he employs. However, I hold that the 
vanishing is in thought, in its intention, which is the direction of thinking’s 
pure movement, its becoming. 
 The vanishing is only a change in form, a change in the activity of 
thinking about that same content. Being and nothing are simply identical 
in content. Yet, in the activity of thinking, they are distinct. As we have 
seen, this distinction is in intention. Thus, when Hegel writes of the unity 
of being and nothing in vanishing, I hold that this is the form-level 
distinction of one and the same content. Yet this unity 'destroys itself' 
because 
 
[b]eing and nothing are in it only as vanishing; becoming itself, 
however, is only by virtue of their being distinguished. Their vanishing 
is therefore the vanishing of becoming, or the vanishing of the 
vanishing itself. (SL 21.94) 
 
Here, just as being and nothing were the terms of a unity and the relations 
of that unity (being is nothing and is not nothing), so in becoming we have 
the vanishing of each term's identity (because contentless) and thereby the 
vanishing of their difference (because both are contentless) and, in turn, 
we now have the vanishing of vanishing itself. If every term and relation 
is contentless and vanishes for this reason, then the vanishing itself is a 
vanishing of contentless pure thinking of nothing and becomes thinking of 
something, of content: 'as existent or [what] has the shape of the one-sided 
immediate unity of these moments' (SL 21.94). 
 Dasein is ‘at rest’, it is ‘quiescent simplicity’ (SL 21.94). Anything ‘at 
rest’ is not becoming. So, Dasein is not becoming. Not being becoming is 
being other to becoming. So, Dasein is other than becoming. Yet thinking 
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through the concept of becoming necessarily leads to the concept of 
Dasein. So, it necessarily leads to what is other than becoming. So, isn’t 
becoming intrinsically related to what is other than becoming? Then isn’t 
becoming intelligible only with Dasein? If so, then becoming is not 
intelligible in abstraction from otherness. I hold that Dasein is a shift to a 
new concept. 
 The concept of becoming does indeed lead to the concept of Dasein 
by necessity and so ‘becoming’ does become other. However, Dasein is not 
part of the content of the concept of becoming, which is an independent 
kind of unity: a negative, as opposed to a positive unity. So, the content of 
the concept of becoming is still intelligible independently of otherness. 
However, there is a way in which it might be said that the content of the 
concept of becoming includes otherness. The concept ‘becoming’ is that of 
the inseparability and difference of pure being and pure nothing. Yet 
difference implies otherness. So, the concept ‘becoming’ is, it seems, a 
concept with otherness as part of its content. 
 Hegel says that pure being and pure nothing are indistinguishable 
in their content. Yet this indistinguishability of content implies there is no 
difference or otherness. So there is no otherness in the content of the 
concept of becoming. Nonetheless, Hegel does say that pure being and 
pure nothing are distinguished. As we have seen, pure being and pure 
nothing are distinguished in intention alone (or in mere opinion, as Hegel 
puts it in the Encyclopaedia). As such, the difference of pure being and pure 
nothing is not at the level of content. The difference of pure being and 
pure nothing is not sufficient for any otherness in the content of the 
concept of becoming. So, the difference between becoming and becoming 
other corroborates the distinctions between the content and the intention of 
thinking used in Part I. 
 Movements identified with gerunds in abstraction from any nouns 
are pure movements. When the gerund is ‘thinking’, the movement is that 
of ‘pure thinking’. This is thinking in abstraction from content. This is 
sufficient for movement, for Hegel. One does not need to ascribe content 
to thinking to ascribe movement to it. One also does not need to ascribe 
thinking to a thinker to ascribe movement to it. Pure movement, without 
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agent or result, is intelligible. Pure thinking, without thinker or thought, is 
intelligible. One might find this to be a familiar idea of ‘Heraclitean flux’. 
 On the view I have suggested, becoming is thinkable without 
thinking about anything and solely by thinking pure being and pure nothing 
a priori. The process of thinking through different acts of thinking, 
regardless of the content, is sufficient for movement. 
 
I would now like to look at three problems for my understanding of ‘pure 
becoming’. The first is a philosophical worry. I have invoked ‘becoming’ 
in the preceding to explain a pure sense of movement. To analyse 
movement in terms of becoming has questionable lacking explanatory 
value if becoming is itself a movement. This would mean explaining 
movement as such in terms of a particular instance of it, which is 
potentially a distortion at best and circular at worst. 
 The second worry is exegetical, on whether I can be right that the 
concept of becoming is a concept of pure movement. Becoming is passive.  
Yet the passive is different from the active. 'I became overweight' means 
something different to 'I made myself overweight'. So, becoming is 
different from the active. ‘Acting’ is a gerund. We said above that any 
gerund captures ‘pure movement’. So, ‘acting’ captures a pure movement. 
We said that ‘active’ is different from ‘passive’. Similarly, ‘acting’ is 
different from ‘becoming’. Yet, becoming is and only is a concept of pure 
movement. In what sense is the active different from this? If incompatible 
and ‘becoming’ (which is passive) is the purest (most general) sense of 
movement, then activity could not involve movement, which would be 
strange at best and conceptually impossible (if activity is intentional 
movement) at worst.  
 The third worry is that just as ‘pure being’ is abstracted from every 
determinate being, so ‘pure movement’ should be so from every 
determinate movement, and so to call things like ‘thinking’ and ‘reaching’ 
pure movements as I have done is to make a mistake. It would be like 
calling particular beings ‘pure being’. Furthermore, ‘becoming’ has some 
kind of determinacy within it, namely that of nothing (‘nothing is’). 
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 Let us take these in order. On the first, Hegel's account of the 
concept of becoming is derived from more basic concepts. These concepts 
(pure being and pure nothing) do not have movement as their conceptual 
content (as we will see later). So, Hegel's concept of becoming is derived 
from concepts that are not of movement. So, the concept of becoming itself 
is not circular. Nonetheless, the concept of becoming is a concept of 
movement. So, another worry about circularity remains. To analyse the 
concept of movement with a concept of an instance movement is not of 
explanatory value. 
 I avoid this worry because I hold that the concept of becoming is 
not a concept of movement. A concept is only a concept of movement if it 
has movement as its conceptual content. Movement is not part of the 
conceptual content of the concept of 'becoming'. So, the concept of 
'becoming' is not a concept of movement. That movement is not part of the 
conceptual content of the concept of 'becoming' is apparent from the 
following. There is no conceptual content of becoming that is not the 
content of pure being or pure nothing. The content of the concepts of 
being and pure nothing is not movement (and cannot be because that 
content, in both cases, is nothing). So, movement is not part of the 
conceptual content of 'becoming'. 
 So, to specify what precisely the content of the concept of 
movement is in terms of the content of the concept of becoming is not 
circular. The content of the former concept is movement. The content of 
the latter concept is not movement, but nothing at all.29 
 Now, onto the second worry. Hegel does hold to a distinction 
between acting and becoming. Yet, acting is a more complex 
determination of becoming. Activity, for Hegel, is to be conceived of as the 
negation of the ‘othering’ in ‘becoming other’ (to be looked at below), but 
not the becoming. The qualification is that the becoming’s result is a ‘self’ 
rather than an ‘other’. To be a more complex determination of becoming 
                                                
29 It also cannot be movement, since this would introduce content other than that 
found in pure being and pure nothing. 
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requires that it is not the opposite of becoming. So, acting and becoming 
are not opposites.30 
 The third worry is answered by extending the answer to the second 
one. Acting is a further determination of becoming. Likewise, any 
movement is a further determination of becoming. Any characteristics of 
X apply to all the determinations of X. So, any characteristics of becoming 
will apply to all the determinations of becoming. As such, they will apply 
to any movement whatsoever. 
 
§15 ‘Becoming an other to itself’ 
 
On the one hand, the movement of ‘what is’ consists in becoming an 
other to itself and thus in becoming its own immanent content. (Phen. 
§53) 
 
The second kind of movement is that of ‘becoming other’. It is that aspect 
of movement that requires reference to otherness. This is expressed with a 
gerund with a noun. For instance, reaching for the pen, falling to the 
ground. That noun must identify that to which the movement identified by 
the gerund relates. The pen is what is reached for. The ground is what is 
fallen to. The noun must also refer to something that is an other to 
becoming. It is ‘other’ in two ways.  
 As stated above, thinking about my day is ‘becoming other’, since it 
is a movement or becoming (thinking) that comes to a rest in something 
other than that thinking (my day). It is thus ‘other’ in two ways. Firstly, 
the concept of that identified with the gerund is distinct from the concept 
of that identified with the noun. Secondly, as just stated, the gerund 
identifies an ongoing process and the noun attached to it identifies 
something other than a process. When the gerund is ‘thinking’ the noun is 
classed as ‘content’. It is what thinking is about. In this case, (1) the 
                                                
30 When I use ‘concept’, I mean to classify what it is at the act-level: a structured 
and unified act of thought. The content of the concept of a concept, however, will 
be a lot more complicated and is exposited in the very ending of the Science of 
Logic and the subsequent parts of the system. 
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concepts of thinking and the content are still distinct and (2) the content of 
thinking is different to the act of thinking. 
 The ‘other’ is characterisable as Dasein. In ‘becoming other’, the 
becoming 'receive[s] its determinateness from an other'. Determinateness 
is differentiation.31 The point here is as follows. Becoming is conceptually 
prior to becoming other. When otherness is expressed with becoming then 
difference is also expressed: namely, the difference of becoming and the 
other. In expressions of ‘becoming other’, the particular kind of movement 
and the ‘other’ in question qualify the intelligibility of (or ‘mediate’) the 
other. 
 The ‘becoming’ of ‘becoming other’ is understood in exactly the 
same way as it would be outside of that relation. The ‘reaching’ in 
‘reaching for the pen’ is understood in just the same way as it is when 
reaching as such (that is, as a pure movement) is expressed. The same is 
true of the ‘other’. ‘The pen’ is understood in the same way in ‘reaching 
for the pen’ and in the simple reference with ‘the pen’. There needs to be 
no constitutive relation between Dasein and the becoming that produces it 
at this level of becoming other. As one author puts it, 
 
[f]rom the perspective of simpler stages of immediacy, mediation 
appears as an external relation among otherwise independent 
phenomena. (Bykova, 2013: 232) 
 
The qualification that this is from the ‘perspective of simpler stages of 
immediacy’ anticipates that not all terms will be related in this external 
manner. We will see how this is not the case in the third kind of 
movement, self-movement.  
 Before that, I want to differentiate expressions of ‘becoming other’ 
from another kind of expression of movement. Sarah Broadie has 
highlighted specific kind of movement to which ‘becoming other’ might 
seem similar: E(mergence)-movement (95-96).32 This captures the idea of 
                                                
31 ‘This state of sublation of the distinction is existence’s own determinateness; 
existence is thus being-in-itself; it is existent, something’ (SL 21.103). 
32 Broadie calls it ‘change’ but she might just as well have called it ‘movement’, 
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being able to express a movement simply with reference to something 
being different to how it was before. This movement is that which is the 
result of moving to B from A. When I move my lunchtime from 13:00 to 
14:00, the E-movement is that lunch is at 14:00 (instead of 13:00). 
 
No doubt there were conditions C causally related to the emergence of 
B, but these were not the change to B itself, nor any part of the change. 
(Broadie/Waterlow, 1982: 95). 
 
‘Becoming other’ is not an E-movement. An expression of an E-movement 
can be made with a simple predicative proposition ‘it is F’ with a contrast 
of F with some other state, ‘(it was Z)’, that need not be made explicit. 
Such a simple predicative proposition and the relevant contrast, then, 
need not make reference to the process whereby F came to be. Yet, such a 
reference is required for expressions of ‘becoming other’. So, an expression 
of an E-movement need not be an expression of a ‘becoming other’. There 
is a further difference. 
 If an expression of an E-movement requires reference to a state of 
affairs with which the result of the movement is to be contrasted, then the 
expression of an E-movement is a more complex expression of becoming 
than that of a ‘becoming other’. If an E-movement requires that contrast, it 
requires something that ‘becoming other’ does not. ‘Moving to 14:00’ is an 
adequate expression of a ‘becoming other’. It does not require reference to 
what is moved from, 13:00, for instance. Yet, any expression of becoming 
that requires something in addition to that required by an expression of 
becoming other must be a more complex form of becoming than 
‘becoming other’. 
 So, ‘becoming other’ does not express movement by expressing 
something being different to how it was before. This is despite the quote 
indicating that it becomes ‘other to itself’ (§53, emphasis added). The ‘itself’ 
here need only refer, I hold, to the becoming, even if in more complex 
cases of movement the contrasting case is indicated, too. 
                                                                                                                                          
since she aims to capture the sense of the ancient Greek ‘kinesis’ which does not 
differentiate between change and movement. 
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Let us look at a concept of change that does captures becoming ‘other’. This 
is the ‘L(eading to)-concept’ change, which includes 
 
the conditions that causally led up to the emergence of B [the new 
state]. Far from being all of the change [as in E-concept change], the 
emergence itself is the culmination of a prior state of affairs which as a 
whole is regarded as the change to B. (Broadie/Waterlow, 1982: 96) 
 
This is a process change. The L-concept version of the change of my 
lunchtime from 13:00 to 14:00 would include causally influencing factors 
that occurred prior to the end of the process, the result. Examples include 
setting up a meeting, deciding to eat later, and letting my understanding 
friends know. The gerund and its result-noun together and only together 
indicate an L-concept. 
 The distinction between E- and L-concept changes is supposed to 
apply to cases of movements, too, since it is supposed to capture the ancient 
Greek word ‘kinesis’, which does not distinguish between change and 
movement. Hegel's concept of mediation is intended to capture the L-
concept of change, which is the process and result. ‘Hegel uses 
“mediation” to refer to both a process and its result’ (Bykova, 2013: 232). 
 ‘Becoming other’ is, however, an L-concept change where the other 
is comprehended independently of that process. In that respect, it shares 




[O]n the other hand, it takes this unfolding back into itself, that is, it 
takes its existence back into itself, which is to say, it makes itself into a 
moment, and it simplifies itself into determinateness. (Phen. §53) 
 
Self-movement is the third kind of movement. Self-movement is that 
which is expressed in an expression of how ‘what is’ or Dasein ‘takes this 
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unfolding back into itself’ (Phen. §53).33 Self-movements are just like 
‘becoming other’: again the distinction is not in the expression’s grammar. 
These are three different aspects of movement. Self-movement differs 
from pure movement and becoming other in the gerund identifying the 
process whereby that which is identified by the noun (the other, the Dasein 
in becoming other) comes to be. Examples include ‘growing of the tree’, 
‘developing of the idea’, and ‘constructing of the house’. Self-movements 
can also be expressed by nominalising the verb, for example, with ‘the 
growth of the tree’, ‘the development of the idea’, or the ‘construction of 
the house’. 
 The process here is a process of construction or a process of 
development.34 Thus, ‘thinking about my plans’ could be thinking about 
plans that are already made. In this case, it is a ‘becoming other’. If, 
however, it is thinking that is constructing these plans, then it could be a 
‘self-movement’. The result of a self-movement is not ‘other’ to the process 
identified in the expression. It is a ‘moment’ of the process. The result of 
the process is not thought as a moment rather than an other. It is a ‘self-
movement’ in this way. 
 The identity, though, is still that of a process and some Dasein. It is 
not of one Dasein producing another Dasein. The agent, that is, is the 
process itself, not a Dasein, not a stable existent. So, ‘I’m reaching for the 
pen’ is a self-movement just because of the relation of ‘reaching’ and ‘the 
pen’, not because of a relation me and the pen or of me, reaching, and the 
pen. Self-movement differs from ‘becoming other’, I hold, just in the 
relation of the result of the movement and the process that leads to that 
result. Reference to an agent is contingent for expressing self-movements. 
 As such, the movement of self-movement need not be absolutely 
opposed in kind as activity to the passivity of becoming. As presented in 
                                                
33 Self-movement is described in many vivid ways, including a return to self and a 
coming home. 
34 Pace La Montagne (2012: 87) I don't hold 'becoming' to be sufficient for ‘self-
development'. 'Becoming other' is not sufficient for self-movement since pure 
movement does not ‘develop’ but simply becomes and in ‘becoming other’ the 
‘otherness’ is precisely not, qua other, a self. Self-development is an instance of 
self-movement only. 
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§53, self-movement is a development from becoming other. It ‘takes this 
unfolding [its product] back into itself’ (§53). I read this as it 
reconceptualising the ‘other’ such as to not be other anymore. 
 Recall, we saw two senses in which there must be ‘otherness’ in 
‘becoming other’. Firstly, the concept of that identified with the gerund is 
distinct from the concept of that identified with the noun. The concept of 
reaching and the concept of the pen are different concepts. Secondly, the 
gerund identifies a movement and the noun attached to it identifies 
something that is not necessarily a movement (since not expressed with 
the gerund). In self-movement, the concept of that identified with the 
gerund is still distinct. The growing and the tree are identified with 
different concepts. So, the first sense of otherness is the same in ‘becoming 
other’ and in ‘self-movement’. 
 However, the second sense is different. In self-movement, the result 
of the movement is identified as a moment of that process that brought it 
about. ‘[I]t makes itself into a moment’ (§53). In one sense, this doesn’t 
alter the intrinsic intelligibility of the oak tree at all. It just adds another 
feature to it, or a developmental context, or a causal origin, perhaps. I 
think the point Hegel seeks to make, though, is that our understanding of 
the Dasein itself does change as we consider it no longer under its aspect 
as other from its process but as a moment of that process. 
 Not only is the oak now a moment of a process, but now the 
difference between it and the process is internalised to the process. That is, 
whilst a tree is not to be equated with its process, that which serves to 
distinguish them, that one is static and the other a process, is itself a 
moment of a process. This is how I understand Hegel’s claim that ‘it 
simplifies itself into determinateness' (Phen. §53). The simplification is that 
there is now just one identity rather than two: that of the process 
encompassing its static moments, rather than the process of growing and 
the static oak. Determinateness is differentiation. So, the simplification 
into determinateness is to make the point that it establishes a single 
identity that is internally differentiated. What is this internal 
differentiation? 
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 In some ways, this means that the process that was previously the 
agent of an external product (the other), now internalises this other and so 
it can be said to be the agent of itself rather than an other. Now, it is no 
longer ‘growing into an oak tree’ nor ‘growth of the oak tree’. The oak is 
just a moment of its process. It is thus not a process that essentially tends 
towards the oak tree and then ceases. The oak tree drops its acorns and 
eventually gives way for them to grow. The ‘self’ of self-movement has a 
contrastive sense. It is no longer ‘other’ but a movement into a moment of 
itself. As such, it is a self-movement. This ‘self’ is not supposed to lead one 
to confuse things with conscious agents. 
 How are self-movements expressed? In some sense, it seems the 
expression should be ‘growing’, since this is the expression of the process 
without expressing another into which the process leads. However, that is 
also how one would express a ‘pure movement’, as we have seen above. 
 As I understand it, self-movement ought to be distinguished from 
pure movement. Hegel presents ‘self-movement’ as something that 
happens after becoming other. In order to express a self-movement’s 
moments, one must express how self-movement results in an other that is 
then reconceptualised as its moment. An expression of a pure movement 
does not require this. That can be done simply through reference with the 
gerund. Here, what is required is an expression of self-movement with an 
expression of ‘becoming other’ showing how this ‘becoming other’ ‘makes 
itself a moment’ and ‘simplifies itself into determinateness’. So, there is, at 
least, a difference in how these are to be expressed. 
 The growth of the oak tree is thus a self-movement in the following 
way: (1) growing (pure movement); (2) growing into an oak (becoming 
other), where the oak is the product of an external agent, the growing; and 
(3) ‘growing’ (self-movement), where the growing differentiates itself into 
its moments (the acorn, the sapling, the oak, etc.). Note how this is a 
reconceptualisation, not a difference in the real oak itself. 
 When the gerund is ‘thinking’ in self-movements, the thinking is 
taken to have content by differentiating itself into its moments. 
Furthermore, thinking does not come to a rest in the content of thinking. 
The content is now taken to be a moment of the process of thinking rather 
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than that in which it comes to a rest. In one case we have something like 
thinking about my plans, where thinking thereby comes to a rest in ‘my 
plans’ or, in other words, ‘my plans’ is the thought that thinking comes to. 
In another we have thinking about my plans as a self-movement where (1) 
thinking itself produces the result; (2) the product is a moment of the 
thinking process, but does not contain the whole of it. That is, the self-
movement of thinking is a whole process of thinking that produces its 
own moments. 
 This is an L-concept change, but with the qualifications just stated. 
 
In self-movement, process and result are not only connected. They are 
inseparable: 
 
in Hegel's system, every result necessarily includes the process leading 
up to it […] In reality, however, mediation expresses the crucial 
interconnection of phenomena which themselves have significance 
only as parts of a comprehensive whole. Thus thought's mediating 
process is a progression towards ever-greater determinateness and 
concreteness; it is the development of an integrated unity of opposites 
which exists for itself. (Bykova, 2013: 232) 
 
As I suggested, the account involves characterising existents as mere 
moments of whole movements. These movements will, in turn, be products 
of wider, more holistic movements as each movement is shown to have 
some otherness as a result, for which a new process must be found. So goes 
the ‘progression toward ever greater determinateness’. The recognition of 
the intrinsic relation between the processes and results in a further aspect 
of that movement, its self-movement, gives the original movement ‘greater 
determinateness and concreteness’.  
 At the level of the activity of thinking, this greater determinateness 
and concreteness involves the content of thinking (thinking’s other) being 
recognised as determinate and as other only in virtue of thinking 
employing a particular concept and the movement is thereby revealed as a 
self-movement: the act of thinking and the content of thinking. Self-
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movement, then, is taking this other ('this unfolding') back into itself. It 
'takes its existence back into itself' (Phen. §53). The latter means that it 
'takes itself as a moment' and 'simplifies itself into determinateness' (Phen. 
§53).  
 ‘Itself’ here refers to the movement of thinking or the content. There 
are two ways of reading it. The movement returns to itself or results in 
that movement that it is rather than resulting in something other than that 
movement on the act-level. The 'existence' here is the 'other' which the 
movement became or the content of thinking. This indicates that becoming 
other, or having content is necessary for the self-movement of thinking 
even if not necessary for the pure movement.35 
 The result of self-movement is not this other but rather 
‘determinateness'. That the movement, as Hegel says in §53 of the 
Phenomenology, ‘simplifies itself into determinateness’ means that the 
becoming has a product and that product is the self, that which identifies 
the process in a self-movement. That it makes itself a moment is 
elaborated on further in the section on difference and identity in the Logic 
when Hegel says that '[b]oth difference and identity make themselves into 
moment or positedness [(or determinateness, as noted at II.267)] because, as 
                                                
35 According to one commentator, what Hegel means by self-movement is a 
process in which spirit 'becomes aware of its opposition against all otherness' 
(Jonkers, 2012: 187). From the account I have given, we can see in what sense, 
indeed, self-movement involves opposition against otherness. Self-movement is, 
by contrast with movement as such or ‘becoming other’, the result of making the 
other that is the result of movement a moment of the becoming rather than a 
result that is external to the becoming. It thus indeed harbours an opposition 
against otherness insofar as the result of movement qua self-movement is not an 
'other' but a self. Jonkers is thus also right to suggest the reflexivity of the result 
in stating that spirit becomes aware of its opposition against all otherness. 
Jonkers also highlights, though, that his formulation is only meant to capture 
self-movement as found in the Philosophy of Spirit. I hold that the account of 
movement is constant throughout the systematic works. Yet I agree that it takes 
different forms in the different parts of the system. As I see it, the difference is in 
the subject that it is moving. Whilst in the logic the subject is pure thinking, in the 
philosophy of spirit, the subject is spirit. I see one way of cashing out this thought 
is to say that the pure thinking and spirit are different ways of characterising 
otherness. In logic, the other of pure thinking is determinate content. In spirit, the 
otherness is that of the particular thinker, with each stage progressing to a more 
universal conception of rational agency until philosophy itself brings us back to 
the notion of pure thinking but through self-abstracting rather than other 
abstracting, as in the pure act of abstraction. Every movement of spirit is a self-
movement, but what is at issue is what exactly that ‘self’ is. 
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reflection, they are negative self-reference' (II.266). A moment is an other 
to which something relates that is constitutive of its self-movement. 
Difference makes itself into a moment because it refers to itself as an other 
(the different must be different from difference) and this 'negative self-
reference' constitutes what it is (and leads to identity). 
 The concept of something’s essence, however, is a concept of its 
becoming (in thought) and it as content (of thought). ‘Its concrete existence 
is only this movement, and it is immediately logical existence’ (Phen. §51). 
The concept of an essence is such that it is the concept of a process and a 
result and this inter-connection (and so is concrete).36 
 There is often sensitivity to this in the literature, even when it is not 
explicitly acknowledged. In discussing consciousness and self-
consciousness, for instance, Peter Simpson notes that '[t]o be self-conscious 
is to have the movement of experiencing that is in-itself, for-itself. If it 
merely posits itself as that truth, it is no different from the in-itself, or 
conscious life, because its own movement means nothing to it' (Simpson, 
1998: 51). Hegel's distinction between movement and self-movement is in 
play here. Positing is a relation to an other and so is a form of ‘becoming 
other’, or mere movement. 
 Insofar as consciousness is the product of a mere movement, it is an 
other to the process that produced it or, as Simpson puts it above, 'its own 
movement means nothing to it'. To be self-conscious is to have that 
movement as incorporated or embodied, part of the consciousness that is 
the result of this process. That is the sense, too, in which 'in its movement' 
it is 'the expression of the truth of selfhood' (Simpson, 1998: 51). To be a 
self just is to incorporate the movement that produced one, but it is 
thereby to become something stable, a Dasein, and so the dialectic 
continues and deepens. 
                                                
36 Hegel's qualification that this is logical necessity might lead one to think that 
this account of necessity will not apply in the philosophy of nature and 
philosophy of spirit in the way it does in the logic. To hold this, one might hold 
that the logical necessity plays no role in the other parts of the system or that it 
plays a role, though it is limited or augmented somehow. The clear parallels 
between sections of the Logic and the other two sections decisively disprove this 
in my eyes, but don't have space to address this concern here. 
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 The account of self-movement here should be distinguished from 
one intuitive sense of self-movement. If I am producing some movement 
and the movement is the movement of me, then I am moving myself. This 
is a plausible way of talking about self-movement. This depends on the 
identity of the agent and patient of movement. This is a plausible meaning 
for 'self-movement' but I don't think it is the meaning Hegel has in mind. 
As we saw, Hegel takes self-movement to involve a distinct result of 
movement. 
 The distinction between movement and self-movement can be 
made without reference to either (1) an agent preceding the movement 
that initiated that movement or (2) the identity of the thing moving and 
the thing being moved. Yet both (1) and (2) are required for identifying the 
above sense of self-movement. So, the distinction in Hegel's work is not 
between movement and the intuitive sense of self-movement just laid out. 
Let’s try and be a little clearer on this point.  
 In some respects, the becoming is itself the agent. It acts on the 
content. However, the notion that self-movement requires a stable existent 
that produces the movement ought to be rejected from a Hegelian 
standpoint. If there is an origin of the movement, it is contingent to the 
intelligibility of that movement. Movement, that is, is epistemologically 
basic in this context. It does not require a prior understanding of 
something at rest with a capacity to move something, say. 
 
§17 Purpose and philosophical thinking 
The understanding of self-movement I have attributed to Hegel clarifies 
the following argument from the 1807 Phenomenology: 
 
Logical necessity in general consists in the nature of what it is to be ‘its 
concept’ in ‘its being’. This alone is the rational, the rhythm of the 
organic whole, and it is equally as much the knowledge of the content as 
that content itself is the concept and the essence — that is, it is this 
alone which is the speculative. – The concrete shape which sets itself 
into movement makes itself into simple determinateness, and it 
thereby elevates itself to logical form and exists in its essentiality. (§56) 
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This is an act-level description. As the act of thinking, self-movement 
means the ‘concrete shape’ of the content just is the act of thinking. It is 
not distinct from the becoming as it is in the case of becoming other. 
 The Phenomenology provides an account of the concept of ‘purpose’ 
as both a concept of a state of rest and a concept of movement. Hegel says 
that ‘purpose is the immediate, is what is at rest, is self-moving’ (§22). 
Purpose is both ‘at rest’ and ‘self-moving’. This is not an isolated incident. 
However, we will focus on it because of the importance, for Hegel, that he 
is right on this point. It is of fundamental importance in grasping the 
operation of speculative reason. 
 The context of the claim makes clear its importance. In §22, Hegel is 
outlining in what sense 'reason is purposive activity'. He uses the above 
characterisation of purpose to make his point. According to Hegel, since 
‘purpose is the immediate, is what is at rest, is self-moving’, ‘it is subject’ 
(§22). The full argument for this is as follows. In §16, Hegel argues that it is 
necessary to overcome formalism in philosophical science. Yet, '[i]t will not 
disappear until the knowledge of absolute actuality has become 
completely clear about its own nature' (§16). To this end, in §17, Hegel 
introduces the claim that ‘everything hangs on apprehending and 
expressing the true not as substance but rather even more as subject’ (§17). 
 As I understand it, the argument in §22 is that reason is subjective 
(in Hegel's sense of 'subjective'). '[R]eason is purposive activity' (§22). 
'[P]urpose is the immediate, is what is at rest, is self-moving, that is, is 
subject' (§22). Therefore, reason is subjective.37 That purpose is at rest and 
self-moving is therefore central to this argument that reason is subjective. 
Why is this argument so important? In the quote from §17, we saw Hegel 
                                                
37 The conclusion should be expressed ‘reason is subjective’, since the alternative 
would be that reason 'is subject' and that cannot be the most palatable expression 
of the conclusion for the following reasons. Consider the following argument. I 
am a rational animal. Reason is power. Therefore, I am power. This doesn't seem 
like a very good argument. A more sensible conclusion, it seems, would be that 'I 
am powerful'. That is, a more sensible conclusion would express the predicate of 
the second premiss in its adjectival form in the conclusion. This seems to be 
because it took an adjectival form in the first premiss. So, Hegel's conclusion 
ought not to be reason is subject, but reason is subjective. Purpose is subject, and 
reason 'is subject' because it is purposive. Reason is subjective. 
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claiming that the true ought to be apprehended and expressed as 
subjective. In §23, Hegel talks of '[t]he need to represent the absolute as 
subject'.  
 These are foundational, methodological points. They aim to set up a 
basic requirement for philosophy that ‘formalism’ cannot meet. In turn, 
they help to motivate speculative philosophy, which claims to be able to 
meet this end. Insofar as a necessary condition of being a subject or 
subjective is that one is at rest and self-moving, and a necessary condition 
of an adequate philosophical system is that it be organised on the principle 
that reason is subjective, then a necessary condition of an adequate 
philosophical system is that it be organised on the principle that reason is 
‘at rest’ and ‘self-moving’. 
 The idea of purpose as at rest and self-movement straight away 
throws doubt on one reading of one of Trendelenburg’s arguments. That 
is, on any argument that includes within it the premiss that something 
cannot be moving because it is at rest. This would preclude the possibility 
of an internal criticism or it must be shown that Hegel is wrong in either 
(1) holding rest and movement to be in some sense compatible; (2) his 
understanding of subjective reason (a) as such or (b) its importance for 
philosophy. The absolute incompatibility of rest and movement as 
characteristics of concepts, however, cannot be assumed and used to rule 
out any of Hegel’s conceptual derivations. That would be to preclude from 
the get go the possibility of the speculative standpoint in philosophy. 
 
We have given an account of in what sense a movement’s process can be 
understood as a self-movement. Yet it also seems that the result of 
movement can be self-moving. Hegel expresses this in talking about the 
content. He says that in self-movement, 
 
the content gives itself this determinateness, it bestows on itself the 




Let us use this to think about what the self-movement of thinking would 
be. Let’s take ‘thinking about an idea’ as an example. This is ‘becoming 
other’ insofar as the idea is distinct from ‘thinking’ in (1) being identified 
with different concepts and (2) thinking being a process and ‘idea’ not 
being a process. This passage speaks from the perspective of the content 
rather than the process. Hegel aims to show how ‘the content gives itself 
this determinateness, it bestows on itself the status of being a moment, 
and it gives itself a place in the whole’ (§53).  
 Yet, I suggested above that self-movement was a process making 
the result of the process a moment of itself and thereby giving that 
moment a place in it as a moment. On the quote above, the content makes 
itself a moment and gives itself a place in the whole.38 In fact, Hegel needs 
to think that the contents of thought can be self-moving, according to his 
own account of logical development. Consider the following quote from 
the Encyclopaedia: 
 
The drive to find in being or in both a fixed meaning is the very 
necessity that expands [weiterführt] being and nothing and gives them a 
true, i.e. concrete meaning. This development is the logical elaboration 
and the progression presented in what follows. The process of thinking 
them over that finds deeper determinations for them is the logical 
thinking by means of which these determinations produce themselves. 
(EL §87) 
 
Though Hegel is keen to emphasise that philosophical thinking is a 
process of thought, Hegel is equally keen to emphasise how the rationality 
of the process of thought is to be evaluated in terms of the content of 
                                                
38 Hegel contrasts this with another case: ‘the content shows that its 
determinateness is not first received from an other and then externally pinned 
onto it’ (§53). The contrast here is not with the other senses of movement. It is 
rather with a different way of thinking grasping the determinateness in question. 
If thinking is thinking about some content, x, in terms of a, something other than 
x, it might do so via first thinking a then thinking x as a. In this sense, the 
determinateness of thinking is the determinateness of thinking a and x is made to 
fit into thinking a. This is what Hegel would call ‘formalism’. Alternatively, one 
might think x in terms of a by thinking about how a gives differentiates itself and 
in doing so gives a place to x. 
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thought alone. Look at the second emphasis in the quote from the 
Encyclopaedia above. In philosophical activity, thinking, strictly speaking, 
does not produce the logical determinations, even if it does construct them 
for itself (the sense of which has been seen above). Rather, in the process 
of thinking over the determinations, one 'finds' 'deeper' determinations (EL 
§87). It is crucial, for Hegel's purposes, that, as Hegel puts it, 'these 
determinations produce themselves' (EL §87). Self-production is a kind of 
self-movement. So, the contents must be self-producing, self-moving. 
 What has already come out of the above is the following. Firstly, 
the sense in which thinking, in being about contents, is a process of 
producing contents such that thinking itself is a kind of self-movement. 
Secondly, that these contents must produce themselves such that these 
contents are self-moving. In thinking about the contents, deeper 
determinations are found. These are produced by thinking insofar as they 
are moments of thinking’s self-movement. However, they are also found in 
the content’s own self-movement. The process of thinking thereby 
involves thinking about some determinations that are the moments of 
something other than the process of thinking: the self-determination of the 
content.  
 In §87 of the Encyclopaedia Logic, thinking also involves a drive to 
find a fixed meaning, a result for the process under investigation. Both of 
these last features suggest that insofar as the contents are self-moving, the 
thinking process ought to be characterised as ‘becoming other’. They are 
contents produced by the contents’ self-movement. To resolve the 
difficulty, we have to appreciate how Hegel holds that something can be 
self-moving whilst still being a moment of the self-movement of another.  
 In love, for instance, loving’s movement involves loving the other. 
As such it is ‘becoming other’. Yet it is also a self-movement, where that 
means that the other is not that in which the loving comes to an end but 
that the other (the beloved) is a moment of the process of loving alongside 
other moments such as desire, for example. The loving continues on even 
after it has ‘reached’ the other and loving is not exhausted by its reaching 
this other. Also, if there are two lovers, this logic does not change, it is just 
instantiated twice. 
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 It is similarly so in the case of the content of philosophical thinking. 
Thinking extends to the content. Yet that which instantiates the role of the 
content can also instantiate the role of thinking such that the contents of 
the logic are themselves process of thinking with their result being that 
they are thought by the reader. The logic of thinking does not need to 
change. It is just instantiated twice. As such, the thinking produces or 
moves itself through and only through the content of thinking. 
 This content might be the thoughts in the mind of the reading 
philosopher (with the process of thinking being the process as found in the 
text).39 Or, they might be the contents of the logic (with the process of 
thinking being the process as found in the mind).40 In either case, the logic 
of the process of thinking and its content is present but instantiated 
differently. They are moments of the same process. Whether the 
philosopher is thinking these contents or the contents are thinking 
themselves is contingent to their identities qua movement. 
 Whether something counts as a self-movement for Hegel is 
independent of the origin of that movement. What matters is whether or 
not the result of some movement encompasses or embodies the movement 
of which it is the result. This contrasts with the intuitive understanding of 
self-movement, on which the proper classification of a movement as a self-
movement depends upon the relation of that movement to the one 
originating or the one classifying the movement. On Hegel's view, the fact 
that the contents of thought only move because the philosopher is 
thinking them is not relevant to whether or not the content is self-moving.  
 The contents of thought move in as much as their result is the 
philosopher having some thought in mind. Something is expressed as 
moving, in Hegel's terms, independently of any agent other than the 
process itself. As such, the question of whether I or they are the agents of 
                                                
39 Insofar as other, contingent content related to the philosopher who is instigating 
the thinking shows up (such as how agitated, tired, or happy one is), it is to be 
ignored as non-philosophical, for it is not the self that the process is interested in 
(which is the process). 
40 Insofar as thinking is active on any other content (such as the etymology of the 
words in which the thoughts are expressed), it is to be ignored as non-
philosophical activity. 
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the process we find in the logic is contingent in this context. The Logic 
seeks only to give the logic of the movement independently of an agent 
other than the process.41 
 One implication of this is that metaphors of 'returns' and 
'homecomings' in spirit are not to be understood as a reconciliation with 
some basic origin, not to be understood in a (stereotypically yet not 
entirely accurately) Rousseauan conception of an ideal primordial unity 
that we ought to strive to return to. For Hegel, coming home, returning 
home, and bringing back into oneself apply to things which never in the 
first place left home — which were never alienated from a prior origin. 
Such origins, on Hegel's terms, are what we work towards, rather than 
what we have come from. The resonances with Aristotle’s unmoved 
mover, which is the origin of all movement through things’ love for it, their 
search to emulate it, rather than due to its primordial existence, are strong 
(Met. Λ, Phys. Θ; cf. Ferrarin, 2004: 140ff.). 
 This involves embodying or encompassing the becoming that has 
produced one such that that becoming is characterised in terms of that end 
point and such that the end-point can be said to be self-moving. Reason is 
purpose, is subject, we saw Hegel say, in the sense that it is self-moving. 
This does not require that there is a purpose-force that exists prior to the 
result. What, in fact, occurs is that the resulting movement, as 
characterised as the purpose of what came before, ought to be 
characterised not just as a result or an external purpose but as the very 
character of the whole movement. 
                                                
41 The issues we have explored above address what might seem like a paradoxical 
relationship between movement and self-movement. For Hegel, the latter is a 
result of the former. Yet self-movements, for Hegel, tend to lead to further 
problems. These categories tend to collapse. This leaves us with a sense of 'the 
need for reconciliation of a standpoint that is simply accomplished and a 
standpoint that is ever accomplishing itself' which 'poses the question of the 
place the philosopher holds' (Clark, 1971: 206). As I see it, Hegel does not see the 
philosopher as defunct, for it is vitally important that the categories are thought 
through by someone and the rationality of the movement evaluated for the mind 
passing through them. Without this, the categories have no actualisation. It does, 
however, leave a question of what the role of the philosopher is if, as is 
commonly conceived, the philosopher's role is to introduce novelty of proof or 
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Adolf Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, pp. 36-40 
3rd edition (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1870) 
 
Through Hegel, logic has come to be transformed after the metaphysical 
aspect.43 His dialectical method promises to achieve to the highest degree 
what we in formal logic miss. It takes a bold grip to develop thought and 
being in unity and, in the way it expresses itself, to constitute the steps on 
which thinking determines itself to be being. If formal logic searches for its 
greatness in the sharp segregation of forms and of contents, the dialectical 
method asserts a self-movement of pure thoughts that is likewise the self-
generation of being. If there is such a dialectic, by which thinking, 
unfolding through itself, through its power alone, the innermost nature of 
things, unfolds then therein we have the fullness of truth and certainty all 
at once. It is therefore our task to investigate this dialectical path. 
 1. It is the basic idea of the Hegelian dialectic that pure thought 
presuppositionlessly generates and cognises the moments of being out of 
its own necessity. That which has been won along the way will later be 
presupposed, and insofar as this [presupposing] is one-sided and limited, 
thinking will be forced to generate the next — complementary — concept. 
 We don't argue preliminarily with this standpoint; may it be 
justified through the Phenomenology. We ask first: is there such a 
presuppositionless beginning of the logic in which thought doesn't have 
anything but itself and spurns all image and intuition such that it deserves 
the name of pure thought? 
 'The beginning is logical, in this, in the element of thought's free 
                                                
42 I give special thanks to Leonie Kühn and Marcello Garibbo, who revised and 
discussed earlier drafts. They are not responsible for its final form, especially not 
the somewhat clunky English. 
43 I have translated this as though Trendelenburg means that Hegel has 
transformed logic into a kind of metaphysics. I am unsure on the meaning, 
however, and so this might not be correct. An alternative translation would be 
that Hegel has transformed logic so that it is no longer metaphysical (in the 
rationalist, problematic sense of metaphysics) but rather a matter for 'pure 
thought'. 
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being for-itself, it should be made in pure knowing.' Thought begins only 
with itself. 
 'Pure being makes the beginning, because, in any case, pure 
thought is qua indeterminate simple immediacy; but the first beginning 
cannot be mediated or further determined.' 
 'This pure being is now the pure abstraction, hence the absolutely 
negative, which, taken immediately in the same way, is the nothing.' 
 'The nothing is qua this immediate, self-same, even so conversely 
the same, what being is. The truth of being, just like [the truth of] nothing, 
is therefore the unity of both; the unity is becoming.' 
 Does pure thought remain in itself in this first stage? 
 We want to take the mediated concept of pure abstraction, through 
which the Nothing is won, and the ambiguous concept of unity, which 
brings becoming to light, as given to thought. Otherwise we would 
perhaps also discover something lying in the background with these 
concepts that lays beyond pure thinking. In order to abstract, something 
must be presupposed from which one abstracts. Understanding pure 
being as pure abstraction is therefore possible insofar as thinking already 
possesses the world and has withdrawn into itself alone.  
 For now we only ask how the essential progress out of bare thought 
could happen. Becoming is first clear through intuition, such that it is 
thereby possible to distinguish in this between being and not-being. 
While, for example, the day is becoming, it already is and also is not. When 
we find these two moments in becoming by separating them it is not at all 
understood how these concepts can be in one another. The one who 
distinguishes between trunk, branches, and leaves has not solved the 
puzzle of how the parts can come into being from a common (source) and 
live through another. We go therefore through the premises of how 
becoming should be understood. 
 Pure being, self-same, is rest; nothing — the self-same — is also 
rest. How, out of the unity of two resting representations, has a moving 
becoming come to be? Nowhere in the antecedent stages is movement 
prefigured, without which [i.e. without the prefiguring of movement] 
becoming would be only a being. Since both pure being and also not-being 
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are expressed as rest, so, consequently, if the unity of both set out should 
come to be, the next task of thinking can only be to find a resting 
unification. If, however, thought produces something different out of 
every unity, it openly bears the other added and implicitly shoves 
movement under in order to bring being and not-being to the flux of 
becoming. Otherwise the moving, always living intuition of becoming 
would never be generated out of being and not-being — these resting 
concepts. Becoming could never become out of being and not-being, if the 
representation of becoming did not come before. Out of pure being, an 
acknowledged abstraction, and out of nothingness, also an acknowledged 
abstraction, becoming, this concrete intuition commanding life and death, 
cannot emerge. 
 Hereafter, the movement of the dialectic that wants to presuppose 
nothing is undiscussed and presupposed. Movement pulls itself through 
Hegel's entire logic, and will after all be drawn in the investigation first 
into the Naturphilosophie. One can say and will say that movement, which 
the Naturphilosophie has to consider, should be a whole other movement; 
the movement of outer nature is itself different from the movement of 
inner thought. If this will be asserted, then the difference would have to be 
stated — this has happened nowhere. Where, however, being and not-
being should pass over into becoming, there is exactly the schema of every 
spatial movement, through which the general representation [of 
movement] will first be possible; and this movement itself accompanied 
the emergence of spiritual concepts. Wherever we turn, movement 
remains the presupposed vehicle of dialectically generating thought. 
 In dialectical logic, thought should determine itself to be being. On 
this point, thought also determines itself as becoming. But then what 
determines thought? Pure being is empty being, there is nothing in it to 
look at, nothing in it to think; and being and nothing came to be the same 
in it. Therefore, it is said, thought determined itself into a concept in which 
one passes over into another. But this deductive 'therefore' doesn't follow 
at all. Pure being is the empty, and the empty the pure. In this complete 
equalisation, every impetus to progress or passing over is defunct. The 
logical reflection of equality will be implemented in a real unity. Who 
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would believe in becoming, if it sprang from there? 
 The beginning of the dialectic is later construed as corresponding to 
the beginning of Euclidean geometry. Call the postulate of the logic: 
‘think’, like the postulate of geometry: ‘take a straight line’. Both sciences 
stride forth through these activities. What lies in the imperative 'think' 
would be presupposed and nothing more. However, the difference 
between both cases arises easily. Geometry postulates something simple; 
dialectic also intended to demand something simple, therefore it specified 
its demands as pure thought. — but look what has happened; this pure 
thought, that only wants itself, cannot get away as this simple; it depicts 
itself in the first steps growing together with a representation, in which 
one acknowledges space and time as moments; it is then not pure thought, 
which is entirely unchained/independent/free from all outward being. 
 If movement together with space and time are presupposed by the 
dialectical movement right at the start, so this becomes to the unbiased 
observer even more evident in the continuation (of the work), precisely in 
the Paragraph about Quantity. There, dialectic claims to generate concepts 
out of pure thought, such as continuity and discreteness, extensive and 
intensive magnitude; it treats the extensive without intuition of space, the 
intensive and number without presupposing time, their relation without 
movement. Whoever believes that these concepts can be thought purely 
through logic, ignores the intuitions that carry them. The traces of 
movement, space, and time are impressed in these concepts down to their 
smallest parts. Without these they have no clarity. 
